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# USSR Report

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No. 7, July 1983

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30 September 1983

## USSR REPORT

## USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 7, July 1983

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## U.S. ACCUSED OF TRYING TO UNDERMINE MILITARY BALANCE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 3-6

[Article by V. V. Zhurkin: "Who Is Undermining Stability"]

[Text] Harvard University Professor Roger Fisher, a prominent American expert on law who is famous for his original ideas about world politics, proposed his own method of preventing nuclear war. As we know, the U.S. President is always accompanied by an officer carrying a black briefcase in which the code for the order to use nuclear weapons is stored. Fisher suggested that this code be enclosed in a capsule and that the capsule be implanted within the body of a volunteer, next to his heart. Before ordering a nuclear attack, the President would first have to kill the volunteer.\*

When he suggested this to people he knew in the Pentagon, Fisher writes in his book "The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War," they replied: "My God, what a horrible idea! The need to kill someone first could alter the President's decision. He might not push the button."\*\*

Although Fisher's suggestion with its connotations of "black humor" is extreme, it clearly points up the moral aspects of the first use of nuclear weapons. The morality and ethics of nuclear strategy have been questioned more pointedly in our day in the pastoral message of the American Roman Catholic bishops and by the growing U.S. movement for a nuclear freeze.

In an attempt to evade questions about the real roots of the arms race launched by Washington and the real reasons for all of its new doctrines and concepts of nuclear attack, the Reagan Administration has been spreading propagandistic rumors since the first days of its existence. These include the imaginary "window of vulnerability," through which Soviet missiles will momentarily rain down on the United States, and the equally fanciful "threat" posed to Western Europe by Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons. The theme of strategic stability has recently become a recurring refrain in this recital. The implication is that this stability is being undermined by the Soviet Union on both the global and the regional, or European, levels.

\* "The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War," Chicago, 1981, p 234.

\*\* Ibid., p 235.

There is no question that the issue of strategic stability, which has always played an important role, is now particularly pertinent. The maintenance of the existing military and strategic balance is one of the most important ways of keeping the peace on our planet. This balance rests on the approximate parity of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, the equality of the two sides' medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the approximate balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact strength in conventional forces and arms.

As for strategic forces, the USSR has around 2,500 carriers of these weapons (1,398 ICBM launchers, 950 SLBM launchers and more than 150 heavy bombers), while the United States has around 2,300 (1,053 ICBM launchers, over 600 SLBM launchers and more than 570 heavy bombers). As for the number of nuclear warheads delivered by these strategic vehicles, the USSR has around 7,000 and the United States has 10,000.

The correlation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe between three NATO members--the United States, Great Britain and France--on one side and the USSR on the other (the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries do not have nuclear weapons) is also distinguished by almost complete equality. Both sides have approximately a thousand carriers. The numbers of NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces are also relatively equal (with a slight overbalance in NATO's favor), and the two cases in which data on the number of airborne and ground forces in Central Europe were exchanged indicated that the situation is similar in this field (around a million people on each side).

Under these conditions, how can Washington speak of destabilization "in favor of the USSR"? This is done with the aid of a simple maneuver: Information about the one weapon system in which the USSR is slightly stronger is isolated from all the data on the balance of Soviet and U.S. forces and is used as the basis for the accumulation of allegations about "Soviet superiority."

In Europe this system is the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missile. Everything else is blithely ignored: the hundreds of American medium-range aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the missiles and planes of U.S. allies--Great Britain and France--and so forth.

Strategic stability is just as simply reduced to the imaginary "vulnerability" of American ICBM's, while Soviet land-based ICBM's are declared the "main destabilizing factor," particularly the SS-18 heavy ICBM's. Once again, other elements of the strategic balance are left out of the calculations, although it is the group or combination of these elements (and not isolated, arbitrarily chosen elements) that represents the material basis of strategic equality.

On this false foundation, U.S. ruling circles made their preparations for an unprecedented round of the arms race, which will cost the American taxpayers more than 1.8 trillion dollars over a period of 5 years and is supposed to disrupt the existing military-strategic balance, guarantee the military superiority of the United States over the USSR and destabilize the strategic situation in the world.

The Reagan Administration is pursuing this policy in two directions at once. The first is the intensive buildup of American military power, particularly

nuclear strength. The second is an attempt to decimate the Soviet defensive arsenal during the course of negotiations by putting forth proposals aimed at the unilateral restriction of Soviet nuclear potential.

This year will be a milestone in the grand-scale upgrading of U.S. nuclear forces, which is intended to secure their potential for a first, "pre-emptive" strike against the other side. Several extremely dangerous steps will be taken in 1983 to secure the ability of the United States to start and fight a nuclear war.

The most irrational of these steps will be the projected deployment of new medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe in December 1983. These missiles, which can destroy targets deep within the territory of the Soviet Union, are designed to serve as a direct supplement to the strategic nuclear arsenal and to tip the present regional and global balance in the West's favor. When the deployment of these missiles has been completed (108 Pershing II missiles by 1985 and 464 cruise missiles by 1988), the number of Western medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe will be augmented 1.5-fold and the number of carriers of strategic U.S. nuclear weapons will increase by 25 percent. The flight time of "Eurostrategic" missiles to targets in the Soviet Union will be reduced sharply (to 5 or 6 minutes): This will be only one-fifth or one-sixth as long as the flight time of strategic missiles launched from U.S. territory.

In 1983 President Reagan made his final decision on the deployment of 100 new MX ICBM's, beginning in 1986, in silos previously used for the Minuteman 3 missiles of the previous generation. The President's decision reiterated the recommendations of the commission headed by General B. Scowcroft, which immediately put an end to the many years of discussions by Washington politicians about the "vulnerability" of American land-based ICBM's by suggesting that the MX missiles be located in the same silos that had always been called "vulnerable."

Where is the logic in this? The answer is obvious: If the United States plans to launch the MX missiles first, the particular silos in which they are located are of no consequence. By choosing to deploy the new MX missiles, the most effective of all missiles ever included in the U.S. arsenal, in the old Minuteman silos, the Reagan Administration essentially acknowledged that these are weapons for a first strike against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, all of the parameters of the new missiles, particularly their heightened accuracy, greater force and higher number of warheads (10, as compared to 3 on the Minuteman 3 missiles), are classic features of a strategic system for a "pre-emptive" strike against the strategic forces of the other side--virtually a textbook example of this.

Furthermore, the MX will not be developed by itself. It will interact with Minuteman missiles, whose destructive properties are being understated in every way possible by U.S. officials. But after all, the re-equipping of 300 Minuteman 3 missiles with the new, more powerful and accurate MX-12A warheads will be completed in 1983. Official documents submitted to the Congress in 1983 by the Reagan Administration frankly acknowledged that this warhead "was designed for use against a broad range of targets, but recent plans have

concentrated more and more on its use against the growing number of hardened Soviet targets."

At the end of last year, U.S. heavy bombers began to be equipped with strategic cruise missiles--another first-strike system. The first thousand air-based cruise missiles will be deployed in the coming year. The development of the underwater component of U.S. strategic forces--the Trident ballistic missile submarines with properties approximating the parameters of land-based ICBM's--has also been stepped up. In numerical terms, all of these efforts should more than double the number of warheads on U.S. carriers of strategic weapons.

Finally, the "crowning touch" to all of these exercises to build up first-strike potential is the program announced by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 for the creation of a broad-scale antimissile system in outer space. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov stressed, "the adventurism and danger of this undertaking stem from the fact that all of these plans are based on the expectation of impunity, on the assumption that a first nuclear strike can be made and a retaliatory strike can be averted. The temptation to push the button is not far from this."

Although the creation of impenetrable antimissile defense is impossible and retaliation is inevitable for the aggressor, the danger of Washington's advancement to the crucial point would increase considerably, particularly in a critical situation.

The Reagan Administration's "arms control" policy has been accompanied by militaristic preparations since the first days of its existence. The dominant theme of this policy has been the naive expectation of unilateral advantages and the hope of destabilizing the strategic situation with the aid of arms limitation and reduction talks.

The proposals put forth by the United States between fall 1981 and summer 1983 have been cut from the same simple pattern. They are supposed to radically reduce the weapon systems in which the Soviet Union is stronger, leave the ones in which the United States is stronger untouched, and open up all the channels through which the United States intends to make new breakthroughs in the arms race in its search for the mirage of military superiority over the USSR.

Obviously, any U.S. and NATO attempts to destabilize the military-strategic balance will be countered by the Soviet Union. In a statement issued on 28 May 1983, for example, the Soviet Government issued a firm warning: If the agreement on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, excluding the possibility of the deployment of new American missiles here, is broken and if this should pose an additional threat to the security of the USSR and its allies, the Soviet Union will take timely and effective retaliatory steps in this area, and these will affect the United States as well as Europe. A fitting response will also be found for U.S. actions in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons, whether these concern the MX missile, cruise missiles or anything else of this kind. In spite of all this, the Soviet Union has invariably stressed its preference for another way of raising the overall level of military

strategic stability. This way is the radical reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe with strict adherence to the principle of equality and equivalent security.

At the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, the USSR proposed a 25-percent reduction in the original ceiling specified in the SALT II treaty--that is, from 2,400 Soviet and U.S. strategic weapon carriers to 1,800. The number of nuclear charges on these carriers would be reduced considerably to equal negotiated levels. This would strengthen the parity of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, and on a much lower level. This can only promote strategic stability.

At the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the USSR proposed that they be reduced in such a way that it would have no more medium-range missiles and warheads than England and France. The number of medium-range aircraft on both sides--NATO and the USSR--would also be reduced to equal levels. This decision would strengthen stability in Europe. Furthermore, the USSR expressed its willingness to take the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe to the extreme--to free the continent of all nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical.

There is no discrepancy between the struggle to strengthen strategic stability and the moral aspects of nuclear disarmament in the Soviet approach. This unity of words and actions is most clearly reflected in the Soviet Union's unilateral pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This pledge is a moral and political challenge to the United States and NATO.

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#### 4. GEROVIZAS FEEL THREAT FROM U.S. ARMS PROGRAMS

Source: *SPRA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed in years of Aug 83) pp 7-13

[Article by G. V. Petrovskiy: "Political Realism and Europe"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Year] Political realism is a dictate of the times, an imperative of the present day. The future development of the international situation will be decided to a considerable extent this year: Either peace and detente will be consolidated or events will progress toward the point of nuclear catastrophe. This will depend primarily on whether new American nuclear missiles are deployed in Europe and whether the massive buildup of U.S. military strength, amounting to a program with a projected cost of a trillion and a half dollars, will begin to be carried out; in other words, either the American administration's irrational, adventurist ambitions for military superiority will be put in action or common sense will prevail.

The question of political realism in connection with Europe is all the more pertinent because it is precisely in Europe that the category of realism was first transferred from the sphere of philosophy, literature and art to the sphere of politics, including foreign policy.

It is particularly important to adhere to the logic of political realism today. It is important not to waste time, not to allow Europe to become entangled in a new round of the nuclear missile race and not to allow the international situation to reach the point at which events are no longer controllable.

It is not difficult to see, however, that an actual disregard for the objective conditions of today's world, coercion, authoritarian behavior, imperial ambitions and a reliance on force, especially military strength, are often passed off as realism in the West.

Obviously, this has nothing in common with genuine realism. The only realistic policy in the nuclear age is one envisaging the resolution of problems through negotiation, and not by force of arms; it must be a balanced policy, free of transitory and emotional considerations. It is now impossible to successfully pursue a foreign policy line without taking the interests and



Chomsky's Law states that, if it is difficult to process the sensory input that we are using to understand a different system of code, we will try to use a different system. There is one other factor – a constant factor in the combination of these conditions, which might not contribute to different states, but clearly is the most of all factors leading to different, inconsistent systems.

Education is particularly bogged with a better assessment of the situation. It is grossly skewed the focus of a principal objective for the growth of quality education and equity to a well.

According to the logic of political realism, an assessment of the European Community's impact on the common sector of interests of the members of the political union, with its interest in avoiding nuclear catastrophe, which is threatening the entire world, includes the European continent, with special reference to the USSR.

These shortcomings of the source do not threaten its value. Important. It does not, as the "Review Board" or the official "Military Superiority" of the Soviet Union, as American propaganda claims, but its five arms race and nuclear control of world peace. Important claims. These principles are accepted by the majority of the United Nations and the United States. The source is a collection of documents by American scientists in arms.

The USSR does not need something that people label "wasteful investments" or something that contradicts according to the "anti-imperialist" principle. After World War II there was found in a lot of way the superfluousness in this regard. The creation of the Soviet Atomic Bomb in 1949 in the United States and in 1949 in the USSR; the creation of the hydrogen bomb in 1950 in the United States and in 1953 in the USSR; the first nuclear submarine appeared in the Soviet Union in the middle of the 1950's and in the USSR at the end of the same decade. MIRV'd missiles appeared in the United States at the end of the 1960's and in the USSR in the middle of the 1970's. The United States is now increasing the employment of the new M3 strategic missile system, while will soon the Soviet Union to create a similar system; 2% plans to employ hundreds of new bombers in Soviet Union will bring the USSR to make the appropriate

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When we discuss the matter at the length of 447, it is obvious that the scene started in the 1980's, provoked by the 1985 IMF program, and the related (and the secondary) events like the economic, social and other areas up to 1990, the policy has remained from the American "arm upgrading" program and the focus is towards the military spending of the NATO countries up to the end of the 1990's (continued).

Aspirations for the time were "confused" to with the concept of the "balance of terror," which was used by the major powers to deter any potential aggression. In reality, the concept was only a disguised a controlling threat.



of all but also stimulates the arms race, particularly in the case of nuclear weapons. After all, it is based on a militaristic postulate formulated by the ancient Roman military historian and writer Vegetius: "If you want peace, prepare for war."

The European advocates of the "balance of terror" are not contented with just the attempt to force Europe to live in fear on mountains of nuclear and conventional armaments. They have gone even further by making it the most probable "scenario of war" where nuclear strikes would be exchanged without anyone pulling the buttons to launch strategic weapons.

Official Washington spokesmen are now discussing the possibility of "limited," "controlled" and other variations of nuclear war. They are trying to calm people's fears by calling nuclear war acceptable. Only a person who deliberately closes his eyes to the realities of our era can fail to see that the nuclear threat, no matter how or where they start, will inevitably go out of control and will grow into a worldwide conflagration.

Europe is probably more mythical in Europe than anywhere else. A reality of the second half of the 20th century--that military force can no longer be used as an instrument of policy in relations between states with differing social systems--is particularly apparent on this continent, with its tragic experience of two world wars and extremely high population density and concentration of cities, material goods and cultural monuments. The unsuitability of military methods in the resolution of problems in today's world has also been illustrated clearly by events outside of Europe, such as the failure of the 1954-56 war against the people of Indochina. In Europe, however, starting a war would be completely outside the bounds of common sense and humanity and would essentially be tantamount to suicide.

There is a close connection between military-political aims and the escalation of the arms race and its negative consequences. In accordance with the plans for "limited nuclear war," American military strategists are striving to move nuclear strikes to advanced frontiers in Western Europe. The plan to deploy intermediate-range missiles there would stimulate the adventurism of the over-armed nuclear powers by convincing them of the possibility of actually starting a war only in the European "theater," taking advantage of the fact that the 10,000 warheads of missiles in Western Europe will take only one-fifth or one-tenth of the delivery time of missiles launched from the United States.

This approach is permeated with the desire for military superiority, which is just as dangerous as it is unrealistic. The concept of military superiority belongs to the particular pages of European history when victory in wars was calculated either by the number of combat elephants, as in the battle of Cannae, or the number of cannons, as in the battle of Waterloo. Under present conditions, military superiority is unattainable. The Soviet Union and its allies will not allow this to happen and will be able, just as they have been in the past, to make the appropriate convincing response to any challenge from the other side. As a result, military equilibrium will be restored, but on an even higher level of arms and military confrontation.

The addition of new weapons to the arsenal will add to the complexity of the military situation, on the contrary, the further development of the threat to peace. enough weapons have already been accumulated to destroy all life in Europe and the rest of the world several times over. The concentration of military strength in Europe alone is several times in excess of the combined power of Western weapons from the time of the Roman legions to World War II. Under these conditions, it would be dangerous and insane to expect to win the arms race or to win a nuclear war.

The addition of new weapons to the nuclear equation in Europe will complicate the situation, will undermine the stability of the military-strategic situation even more and will increase tension on the continent and in the rest of the world. A new round of the arms race would mean that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would become even more complex. This would considerably increase the difficulty of drafting international agreements on arms limitation and reduction.

It is completely obvious that the haphazard growth of military armaments is hampering the international peaceful cooperation and will keep the European countries from putting their efforts to solve such global problems as the development of power engineering, the protection of the environment, the conservation of the world ocean, the eradication of the most dangerous diseases and so forth. Militarism is a threat to the security, happiness and, last but not least, the very future of Europe.

In contrast to the manifestations of the militaristic demons, genuine political realism offers the actual possibility of stopping the dangerous developments. The present day, reverting them in a healthy direction, strengthening mutual trust, according the entire sequence of objectives in the limitation and reduction of weapon armaments, particularly in the case of nuclear arms, and consistently lowering the level of military confrontation. The only requirement is the political will of states to unite their efforts in the consistent pursuit of the policy of detente, peace and disarmament.

Detente is the necessary prerequisite for the permanent regime of genuine coexistence. All of the European states have experienced the advantages of detente. There are no states here whose interests would not be served by the intensification and multiplication of its results.

It is true that European detente did not put an end to all of the conflicts among states of different systems, but it certainly was not, as R. Flaxinger would say, only a "limited compromise" or an attempt to survive in a world where hostile ideologies are gathering. The processes resulting from detente are in tune with the European states' deep and vital interests in security and peace.

It is quite obvious that even now, despite the icy winds and belligerent outbursts coming from the camp of the opponents of detente, the material basis for peaceful cooperation, which was laid by the all-European conference in 1974, is still being developed. Political contacts between governments are becoming broader and more meaningful. Economic, scientific, technical and cultural contacts have increased and are acquiring new features.

The main thing, however, is the approximate balance of military strength between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It was not in the cornerstone of the entire edifice of defense erected in Europe.

In Europe this balance, which places specific quantitative and qualitative limits on military strength, extends to medium-range nuclear weapons and to conventional arms and armed forces. In the case of medium-range nuclear weapons (5,000 kilometers or more, but less than intercontinental), the balance of Soviet and NATO strength has remained approximately the same for several years--around 1,000 units on each side. Specifically, the NATO countries have 540 weapons of nuclear weapons of this range, including over 720 American land and sea-based airplanes. Besides this, 64 ballistic missiles and 50 bombers constitute the English potential, and 98 missiles and 46 bombers constitute the French. The Soviet Union has 975 weapons of this kind. The medium-range weapons in NATO's possession can simultaneously launch 1.5 times as many nuclear charges as the USSR's weapons.<sup>1</sup>

As for conventional weapons and general-purpose armed forces, there are 94 divisions from the NATO countries (counting Spain) in Europe, as compared to 104 divisions from the Warsaw Pact countries. Furthermore, a full American division consists of 16,000-19,000 men, and the West German division consists of more than 20,000, while the army divisions of the Warsaw Pact countries have a maximum of 11,000 soldiers.<sup>2</sup> In general, the correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in Europe is 1.27:1 (2.123 million and 1.669 million personnel respectively).

It is significant that there is also an approximate balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in Central Europe. The second exchange of official statistical data at the Vienna talks (on 1 January 1983) corroborated this approximate balance in this region in the total number of NATO and Warsaw Pact airborne and ground troops (991,000 and 979,000 personnel respectively, including 197,000 and 196,700 ground troops and 198,500 and 182,300 airborne troops).

The existence of this parity has been acknowledged more than once by experts and statesmen from the United States and other NATO countries. They have acknowledged it, but it has been an increasingly exasperated acknowledgement in recent years. On 5 June 1981, for example, A. Haig, who was then the U.S. secretary of state, said: "Approximate parity in strategic nuclear forces still exists" between the United States and the USSR. American spokesmen later began to allege that the balance had been tipped in favor of the Soviet Union or would be tipped in its favor (since the absurdity of the allegation that this could have happened in a year or a year and a half was already quite obvious). The purpose of this lie is self-evident: the attainment of military superiority under the cover of conversation about the need to "restore the balance."

In contrast, it is not an easy matter to accept new realities. But this is the basic feature of political realism. The supporters of this current of political thought in the West--prominent bourgeois politicians and diplomats--have

repeatedly pointed out the fact that intelligent political leadership consists in the ability to accept new ideas and discard old ones. One of the idols of contemporary Western diplomacy, Bismarck, often remarked that the most dangerous thing for a diplomat was to give in to illusions. Another authority, Bialotocki, taught that the main thing in politics is the ability "to determine one's obligations in line with circumstances and as they arise."

Even now, authoritative members of the ruling class in the West are advising the abandonment of the militaristic policy of Washington and NATO with a view to present realities. The bases of this policy, according to M. Bundy, G. Forman, R. McNamara and J. Smith, who occupied high positions in various American administrations, "were originally laid when U.S. superiority in nuclear weapons was overwhelming, but this superiority ceased to exist long ago and cannot be restored."<sup>3</sup>

Realism demands the acknowledgement of these facts as a prerequisite for efforts to reduce the danger of war and to limit and then dismantle military armaments. Europe now has tremendous intellectual potential, capable of finding answers to the most difficult and complicated problems. Its role in the resolution of the most important global problems--the preservation of life and civilization on our planet--must be commensurate with its historically determined place in the world.

It is significant that the bases of the realistic approach were already negotiated by states during the period of detente and were recorded in the final act of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe and in the bilateral documents of the USSR and the United States and of the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe.

The final document of the first special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, which was adopted unanimously by the members of this organization, says that the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear armaments, "is now more likely to endanger than to protect the future of nations. For this reason, the time has come to put an end to this, to prohibit the use of force in international relations and to seek security through disarmament."

Paths leading in this direction are already being paved in Europe.

The most important are the SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS ON THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, the latest round of which began on 17 May 1983. The positive outcome of these talks could break the vicious circle in which the actions of one side are counteracted by the other. In this case, realism means that BOTH SIDES must work toward a lower level of nuclear confrontation and must participate in reductions.

What did the United States bring to these talks? The main element of the so-called "zero option" with which it began the talks, and on which theme it is still playing variations, is the suggestion to eliminate only one type of medium-range nuclear weapon--the land-based missile--and only on the part of one nuclear power in Europe--the Soviet Union. The American administration has refused to reduce its own medium-range nuclear weapons deployed on the

European continent and has objected to the inclusion of English and French weapons in the total. At the same time, it has tried to reduce Soviet weapons not only in the European part of the USSR but also in all other Soviet regions, on a pretext of which the number of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe would be cut by more than half while the number of NATO weapons would not be reduced by even a single unit. In fact, this number could even rise. One original and global balance of power, which is now distinguished by approximate parity, would be undermined dramatically, and the situation in Europe and the rest of the world would be less stable.

The so-called "intermediate" solution now proposed by the United States has not changed the essence of the American approach. It has the same purpose as the "zero option"—to change the balance of nuclear forces in Europe in NATO's favor. Neither the English and French nuclear weapons nor the American nuclear air carriers are included in the "zero" or "intermediate" options, but they both demand the eradication of medium-range Soviet missiles even in the Asian part of the USSR, although this has nothing to do with Europe.

It is clear that the aim of the U.S. approach is not a lower level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, but the attainment of unilateral military advantages. It is also clear that this approach has nothing in common with political realism. It does not attest to a sober U.S. assessment of the world situation or of U.S. capabilities and the capabilities of the other side. How can it demand that the Soviet Union agree to unilateral disarmament and ignore the facts that 700 American planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which constitute U.S. forward-basing strength in Europe, and the more than 260 English and French nuclear missiles and aircraft aimed at targets on Soviet territory and the territory of other socialist countries?

All of this suggests that Washington would like to break the agreement and call the talks a failure so that it can deploy its missiles in Europe. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the NATO countries have invariably confirmed their intention, under U.S. pressure, to begin the emplacement of these weapons at the end of 1981 if an agreement has not been reached at the talks prior to that time. This approach, which is tantamount to setting an artificial deadline for the talks, could mean that the talks will be delayed so that the absence of an agreement can be used as an excuse for the actual deployment of American missiles. In short, the United States does not want to give up its attempts to undermine the approximate balance of forces in the European zone and to gain a decisive advantage for NATO either through the unilateral disarmament of the USSR or through the dramatic augmentation of its own, already considerable nuclear strength in Europe.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go quite far. As we know, the USSR has proposed the eradication of all types of nuclear weapons in Europe, both medium-range and tactical. This would be the real zero option.

If the other side is not ready for this kind of radical solution, the USSR has proposed the mutual reduction of medium-range weapons to less than a third of the previous number. In particular, it is willing to keep only as many missiles in Europe as England and France have there—that is, the USSR and the



NATO countries would still have 167 missiles each. This means that the Soviet Union would reduce the number of its medium-range missiles 50 hundred, including dozens of its most modern missiles, called the SS-20 in the West. Only reduction would be fair to both sides--the Warsaw Pact and NATO--and would set the lowest possible equal levels under present conditions. Furthermore, if the number of English and French missiles should be reduced in the future, the USSR would reduce the quantity of its missiles by the same number. In addition to this, the Soviet side proposed the reduction of Soviet and NATO planes carrying nuclear weapons to equal levels. This would mean that each side would retain 118 medium-range planes, and this number could be reduced on a mutual basis in the future.

The Soviet Union went even further. It announced its willingness to negotiate the equality of nuclear potential in Europe both in terms of carriers and in terms of warheads, but certainly with the inclusion of English and French weapons. This would maintain the approximate balance between the USSR and NATO in carriers of medium-range nuclear weapons--that is, missiles and aircraft--as well as in the number of warheads on them, and this would be a balance on a much lower level than at present.

It is obvious that the Soviet proposals are more realistic and are aimed at an honest and fair agreement. They hold out the promise of a real solution to the problem of limiting nuclear weapons in Europe and can "completely guarantee," as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov said in his address to West Germany's SPIEGEL magazine, "real equality and truly equal strength." They can only be interpreted differently by those who believe that there is something more important than the preservation of peace and life on earth.

The United States, however, has continued to publicize the Reagan Administration's so-called "zero" and "intermediate" options, which are actually destined to undermine the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. Both of them are devoid of a realistic basis and are dictated by the desire to accomplish the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Europe in one way or another.

Washington has tried to conceal its unconstructive position behind a propaganda screen. On the one hand, people there declare that the talks are being conducted in a serious and businesslike manner. On the other, they immediately contradict themselves by alleging that progress is being impeded by the intransigence of the Soviet Union. They are also spreading the rumor that the Soviet Union will give in eventually, when the time comes to act on the NATO decision. The purpose of this tactic is obvious: It is supposed to quell antimissile demonstrations in Western Europe and simultaneously test the strength of the USSR's nerves by means of an exercise in blackmail.

Another important road to security is represented by the VIENNA TALKS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMS IN CENTRAL EUROPE--a region which has been the theater of the two world wars that took the lives of 55 million people. The actual lack of progress in these talks is an understandable cause for alarm. The NATO countries are obviously trying to delay them and to use them as screens to conceal the buildup of their own military potential, including their strength in Central Europe. After rejecting the proposal put forth

the 1970-1971 period, in 1974, in a memorandum on the number of armed forces in Central Europe. During the negotiation period, the United States sent 35,000 more troops to this region; the Soviet Union, on the other hand, unilaterally withdrew 70,000 of its servicemen, 1,000 tanks and other military equipment from the territory of the GDR.

The NATO countries' attempts to extend reductions only to specific components of armed forces are also aimed at the acquisition of unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the legitimate interests of the socialist community countries. It is no coincidence that the United States and its allies have refused to reduce or even to limit airborne forces. They are planning for an uninterrupted buildup of military preparations and have therefore refused to consider the reduction of arms and combat equipment, in spite of the agreements reached during preparatory consultations. The Western side is attempting to put an extremely awkward and cumbersome package of so-called "confidence-building measures," including completely unjustifiable measures of control, and has insisted that some of them extend far beyond the boundaries of Central Europe. This is also inconsistent with the negotiated object of the talks. "This is an obviously unrealistic position.

The foundation of the position taken by the USSR and other socialist countries at the Vienna talks consists primarily in the fact that all of the proposals put forth by the Warsaw Pact states during the discussions in the Austrian capital are aimed at strict consideration for the security of both sides and are conformant with the agreements reached on the object of the talks during preparatory consultations (January-June 1973). In accordance with the principle of equality, the socialist countries have insisted that the process of reduction must include both airborne and ground troops and both the number of armed forces and the number of arms of all states having troops in Central Europe. This approach could effectively lower the level of military confrontation in the center of the European continent.

Taking a completely serious and responsible approach to the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe and to a lower level of military confrontation in this region, the socialist states have not limited themselves to the simple acknowledgment of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Vienna. Their top leaders put forth a group of new proposals and considerations in the Prague political declaration of 5 January 1983, including proposals pertaining directly to the talks in Vienna.

In line with these initiatives and in the hope of ending the impasse at the talks, on 17 February of this year the socialist countries proposed a totally reasonable, simple and practical way of reaching an agreement in Vienna, namely the negotiation of the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in Central Europe to equivalent collective levels of 900,000 people on each side, regardless of differences in the number of troops they have at present. Each side would independently determine the best ways of reducing its collective armed forces to the necessary ceilings. It is significant that no side would have more than 400,000 people in its armed forces in Central Europe, including no more than 700,000 ground troops.

The essence of this new socialist proposal is to overcome, without injuring the security of either side, the so-called "numerical barrier" erected by the West—that is, the unproductive and futile arguments about which side has more or fewer soldiers—and thereby to make the necessary reductions possible. The socialist countries firmly believe that all of the necessary prerequisites exist so that an agreement can be reached at the Vienna talks quite soon—within a year.

So that the level of military confrontation in the center of Europe can begin to be lowered without any further postponements or delays, the socialist countries have proposed that the first practical step toward the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe be taken by the Soviet Union and the United States as a mutual example, outside the bounds of a treaty.

The USSR is willing to withdraw another 20,000 of its ground troops, in addition to the 20,000 Soviet servicemen recalled earlier from the territory of the GDR on a unilateral basis, from Central Europe within the next year on the condition that the United States withdraw 13,000 people from its ground forces from the region within the same period.

The socialist countries proposed the negotiation of mutually acceptable and appropriate measures to verify this specific move and larger reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces.

The socialist countries proposed that the reduction of Soviet and American troops as a mutual example be followed by a freeze on the armed forces and armament levels of all direct participants in the talks, which would remain in effect throughout the negotiation period.

The socialist proposals do not put anyone in an unequal position. They will have the same meaning for both sides. They provide a real opportunity to achieve concrete positive results by abandoning all types of arguments. All that is required is the political will of the sides.

Another way of curbing the arms race in Europe would be THE CONTINUATION OF THE PROGRAM BEGUN IN HELSINKI. It is with good reason that the military aspects of European security, primarily the organization of a conference on confidence-building measures and on security and disarmament in Europe, are the central point of discussion at the current Madrid meeting of the states party to the Helsinki Conference. In line with the wishes of many West European countries, the Soviet Union agreed that future confidence-building measures would be substantial in the military sense, would be politically binding and would be accompanied by appropriate forms of verification corresponding to their content.

The Soviet side also took an important constructive step in the determination of the time of application of these measures. It announced its willingness to extend the measures to the entire European part of the USSR, but only on the condition that the zone also be extended by the Western States, since otherwise—and this is precisely what the United States wants--the balance of forces and interests in Europe would be destroyed. Since NATO's military preparations do not begin at the continental edges of Europe, the confidence-building



Security should extend to the maritime regions and air space adjacent to Europe. Of course, this applies only to the part of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to Europe and does not include the territory of the United States and Canada. The boundaries of these maritime regions and air space can be discussed at the conference. This also reflects the realism of the Soviet approach, since it would obviously be difficult to determine the precise boundaries at the Madrid meeting.

Finally, the basis of a solution--and, what is more, a realistic basis, consistent with the interests of all parties to the conference on security and cooperation in Europe--exists. All that is needed is for the West to give up its unilateral attempts to tip the balance of power in its own favor and to shift unilateral advantages at the expense of the Soviet Union.

In addition to requiring progress at current talks, the realistic approach to European affairs demands dialogue on other pertinent questions of military defense and arms limitation in Europe.

Now that international tension has reached a dangerous level as a result of constant steps to escalate the arms race, THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE MUTUAL NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO COUNTRIES would be of great significance in the establishment of a healthier atmosphere and the restoration of the shaken faith in peace. If an agreement could be reached to exclude the possibility of an armed confrontation between these groups of states, an essentially new and immeasurably better atmosphere would be created to stop the current dangerous course of events, give the process of détente new momentum and thereby attain all successive objectives in the limitation and reduction of arms, particularly nuclear weapons.

In particular, the parties to this treaty would be obligated not to initiate the use of nuclear or conventional weapons against one another and, consequently, not to initiate the use of military force in general against one another. This completely refutes the "counterargument" that the Soviet Union supposedly intends to use conventional weapons for an attack on Western Europe. It is on the strength of this argument that the United States and its nuclear NATO allies are refusing to follow the USSR's example in pledging not to use nuclear weapons first.

An important feature of the treaty proposed by the socialist countries is that it envisages not only international legal obligations on the non-use of military strength, but also several other extremely significant obligations to consolidate peace and reinforce trust and mutual understanding. For example, the treaty is supposed to contain a pledge by both sides to negotiate, in a spirit of goodwill, effective measures to curb the arms race, limit and reduce weapons and accomplish disarmament. This underscores the organic connection between the moral and political aspects of security and practical steps toward disarmament, thereby heightening its effectiveness. The treaty would be drafted and signed by members of both alliances and by all other interested European states, and it could later be signed by any world state wishing to do so.

In the struggle for peace in Europe, the Soviet Union is not setting primary goals and is not claiming a monopoly on the issue. The main thing is to reach a state of equilibrium in all important directions and to conduct political and diplomatic talks on various problems. We are also prepared to discuss agreements in other directions. This is the program of approach of the Soviet Union to European and world affairs.

As we know, at the end of 1962 the SOVIET GOVERNMENT approached the USSR, the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO states with the proposal that a zone free of "battleground nuclear weapons," approximately 200 kilometers in width, be created in the center of Europe on both sides of the line separating the Warsaw Pact states from the NATO countries. The Soviet Union has already made its position, as in all cases of proposals aimed at the actual curtailment of the arms race and reinforcement of security, the reply was affirmative.

Furthermore, considering the technical and tactical characteristics of the nuclear weapons in question, the capabilities of tactical aviation, which is one of the main components of the battleground weapon arsenal, and the increase in the range of tactical missiles, the Soviet Union proposed the width of the zone be 500-600 kilometers instead of 200. This would make the zone truly effective and would aid in the considerable reduction of the nuclear threat. It would also alleviate the tense atmosphere of nuclear confrontation, which has become deep in Europe, particularly in its central region, and is being compounded by the actions of NATO countries. With a view to these considerations, the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate the geographic dimensions of the zone and other matters, including the verification of the fulfillment of obligations with regard to this zone.

THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS PROPOSALS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN OTHER PARTS OF EUROPE, as it regards their creation as an important sphere of the struggle to consolidate peace and security in Europe and as one way of creating the entire continent of nuclear weapons-free tactical and medium-range.

In particular, this kind of zone could be created in Northern Europe. Finland proposed this long ago, and the Soviet Union has repeatedly declared its positive attitude toward this specific proposal. The USSR is willing to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North European countries included in the nuclear-free zone--that is, the countries refusing to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or to allow their emplacement within their territory. This guarantee should be secured either by means of a multilateral agreement with mutual participation or by means of bilateral agreements with all of the countries in the zone. The Soviet Union will not make this pledge conditional upon a positive attitude toward the zone on the part of other nuclear powers, although the creation of this zone would obviously be of much greater value to the participants if the NATO nuclear powers could also make this pledge.

It should be mentioned that the USSR does not exclude the possibility of introducing some other measures, and substantial ones, in Soviet territory adjacent to the nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe.

...zone could also be created on the opposite, southern flank of the European continent—in the Balkans. Its creation has already been suggested by several countries in this region, and the Soviet Union supports this proposal because it believes that this would consolidate security in this zone and in Europe as a whole.

The Mediterranean region could become a zone of peace and cooperation if an agreement could be reached on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean Sea and on the refusal to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the Mediterranean non-nuclear countries.

Another direction in which steps must be taken is the STRUGGLE TO FREE EUROPE OF THERMAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. This objective, which is important in itself, is particularly pertinent now that the Pentagon is drafting plans (and already carrying them out) for the creation of new, so-called binary chemical weapons, intended for deployment in Europe. In the Prague political conference, the Warsaw Pact countries express their willingness to join other concerned states in the investigation of all possible ways and means of banning chemical weapons on the continent and beginning the necessary negotiations.

The Soviet Union favors the negotiation of all these matters. The main thing is to move on to practical action. This will be possible only if all European states unite their efforts in pursuit of the policy of detente, peace and agreement.

The powerful initiatives of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community are evidence of their determination to do everything possible to strengthen security in Europe, ensure the positive development of intergovernmental relations on the continent and improve the atmosphere throughout the world.

Within the context of this realistic approach, however, it is also obvious that progress in the improvement of the European situation cannot be expected if only one side is striving for this, if it is the only one to put forth initiatives and proposals while the other side refuses to consider them. Positive results cannot be expected in the absence of reciprocity.

Consequently, recently we have frequently encountered precisely this situation. Examples are not difficult to find. The talks on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe have already been discussed. The Vienna talks are another example. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have met their Western partners more than halfway in these talks, but no reciprocal movement has been seen on the other side. Furthermore, on some matters the position of the Western side is even more negative now than it was several years ago. This means that even if there is some movement on the West's part, it is a movement away from agreement instead of toward it. The situation in Madrid is another example. Here the United States and its most zealous apprentices cannot even find the time to discuss the new Soviet initiatives. There is no question that this kind of approach cannot produce positive results.

When the Soviet Union speaks of the realistic nature of its foreign policy initiatives, it means that they are in our interest but they also take the

position of the other side into account. Furthermore, the USSR is willing to consider the ideas of other states, as it did when it supported the Swedish Government's recent proposal.

One of the main requirements of political realism consists in moving ahead and deriving the practical results in negotiations instead of simply maintaining and expanding forums for dialogue. In the Soviet Union's opinion, the purpose of talks with the United States and other Western countries, G. V. Andropov mentioned, particularly talks on ways of curbing the arms race, does not consist in an official record of disagreements. The USSR views these talks as a way of uniting the efforts of various states for the sake of results benefitting all sides.

The lamentable fact that the sun sets in the West, which is reflected in the very name "Europe" (from the Phoenician word "ereb" or "irib," meaning sunset), has given many thinkers, particularly philosophers of the pessimistic school, a basis for allegories to substantiate the inevitable approach of "darkness"—darkness, decline and even the death of European civilization as such. But after all, this natural phenomenon could be viewed in a different way, and in line with the same allegories. In the soft and mild rays of the setting sun, the European cultural experience accumulated over centuries is seen in sharp detail, and the centuries-old wisdom, common sense and humanism of the most progressive European states, advocating the future of Europe with peace and prosperity, are illuminated. And if we must turn to historical imagery, would it not be better to remember that the ancient Greeks gave the name Europa to their goddess of the age-old human occupation of farming. But before this vitally necessary work can be performed in peace, lethal weapons must be removed from the European fields and swords must be reforged into ploughshares.

Our tendency to make references only to sad past experience, connected with the two most important international conflicts of the 20th century, both world wars, which, alas, signifies a refusal to see something else: that it was precisely this experience that made the European people aware of the disastrous consequences of war.

The Soviet Union does not approve of pessimism and resignation and believes that Europe can and should fight for a better future. The main thing now is to take immediate measures to strengthen peace and defense. This is essential not only dictated by the realistic approach to problems in Europe and in international life in general. During the period of détente Europe set an example in the development of relations of peace and cooperation between states, and under present conditions it can and must set an example of political realism in the interest of peace and in the interest of present and future generations.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Iz kogo istokov agrozna mira" [The Source of the Threat to Peace], Moscow, 1973, p. 17.

2. See also data on several important indicators of weapons.

**AIR/AL AVIATION AND HELICOPTERS:** Despite the slightly higher number of combat planes in the Warsaw Pact countries, NATO has the advantage in the combat capabilities of aviation support and in the number of helicopters.

The correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in this area is the following:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>
Combat planes	1	1.2
Shipping payload with a delivery range of 185 kilometers	1	1
Helicopters	1.8	1

**TANKS:** Before Spain entered NATO, the Warsaw Pact states had a slight advantage in tanks. After Spain entered NATO, however, this slight advantage ceased to exist. The U.S. and NATO leaders include only the tanks under the jurisdiction of the bloc's united armed forces command in Europe among their own. In this way, they considerably understate the number of tanks they possess (supposedly less than 12,000 in all). In fact, the forces of the NATO countries (including Spain) have more than 17,000 tanks. Besides this, around 1,500 American tanks and 6,500 tanks belonging to West European NATO countries are stored in Europe. Consequently, in terms of the total number of tanks (25,000) the NATO countries are not surpassed by the Warsaw Pact countries, and in terms of the number of antitank weapons the NATO states hold the advantage.

3. *ARMED FORCES*, Spring 1982, p. 734.

4. *ARMED FORCES*, 28 April 1983.

5. *Pravda*, "Izvestiya 'Nauka', 'SSSR--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya'", 1983.

6. *Pravda*, 180/12.

## DECLARATION OF U.S. INTERFERENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

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(Article by A. V. Kuz'myuchenko)

The Sandinista people's revolution in Nicaragua, which began in 1979 and put an end to the Somoza regime that had served Washington so faithfully for more than 40 years, evoked something like shock in U.S. official circles. For 20 years all of their efforts had been aimed at the isolation and destruction of socialist Cuba. But the new situation of revolution in Central America proved quite conclusively that the revolution in Nicaragua and the Cuban revolution were not isolated events, but stages of a growing revolutionary struggle in the countries of this region. The collapse of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua marked the beginning of a chain reaction of crises in the puppet and oligarchic regimes in the subregion, which are now being led by the United States and has helped American imperialism secure its hegemony here for decades.

The crisis of 1979 was repeated in El Salvador in the last months of 1980, and the stability of this country has been waging a difficult, heroic struggle for more than 1 year against the pro-American puppet regime and all those who are aiding it—both directly and indirectly. The broad popular masses in Guatemala have been actively involved in the struggle against the brutal rule of the successive dictatorships of the last three decades. In Honduras the growth of the antimilitarist, antioligarchic and anti-imperialist movement has led to a situation in which the military elite had to give up virtual rule of the country and turn the government over to corrupt bourgeois politicians. In Costa Rica the increasing influence of armed leftist forces forced the local oligarchy to put socialist-reformists behind the wheel of state in order to make an attempt at reinforcing the capitalist order here with the aid of foreign aid.

The attempts of the ideologists and theorists of the U.S. ruling class to find the reasons why this situation exists is at an impasse, have led to the publication of several studies. The authors of two of them, published in 1980, determined in other words what American policy in Central America in the 1980's should be. It is particularly significant that the authors of both studies are members of the intellectual elite of the American establishment, which generally provides the intellectual for the "think tanks" that make U.S. foreign policy. A



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The first (character of publication) of these documents is officially called "A New Third American Policy for the Eighties,"<sup>1</sup> but it is better known as the "Santa Fe Document." Its authors, a group of conservative professors and retired officers generally who once held prominent positions in the Pentagon, belong to the Committee of Santa Fe, which is something like a political club close to the Republican Party leadership. The official name of the document does not reflect the authors' pretensions to a global approach to U.S. foreign policy issues. It contains many statements about Western Europe and Japan, including the opinion that the alliance with them constitutes the "basis of U.S. power." In the Western Hemisphere they assign Canada the role of a faithful ally, actually following in the wake of Washington policy; in their disquisitions of the Latin American countries, the "Santa Feans" advocate the "keynote of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine" and stronger military cooperation within the framework of the "Rio Pact." But the "Santa Fe Document" assigns a special role to policy toward the Central American states, calling them the "strategically vulnerable underbelly" of the United States.

The tone of the study is set in the foreword, the author of which, President Reagan, at the National for Inter-American Security, writes: "The part of the Western Hemisphere lying south of our border could be called the American Balkans, in analogy with the explosive region of southern Europe that became the theater of World War I." According to the "Santa Fe Document," Central America "has fallen into the clutches of the Soviet bear"; the "Marxist conspiracy of Nicaragua" and "Soviet expansion" have turned the Caribbean Sea into a "Moscow-Baltic Lake." On the basis of this premise, the authors of the document conclude that America must once again assume the role of a cementing, indispensable force in the Western Hemisphere and sound the call for a struggle for "Western" and "National interests." They also suggest the appropriate "diplomatic action like the occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965." In general, the Latin Americans deserve punishment, the authors state, "not" relative Nicaragua and Cuba, and primarily Cuba, where the economic blockade should be supplemented with overt punitive measures. Besides this, the report recommends the resolute support of the United States' "faithful allies" in El Salvador and Guatemala (that is, the puppet dictatorships in those countries). The Carter Administration, according to the "tough guys" from the Committee of Santa Fe, was incapable of implementing their recommendations; the struggle against the "red menace" required a "militant president," under whose leadership America could win "World War III" and so forth.

In May 1985, when the "Santa Fe Document" was published, it might have been interpreted as a careful attack on the Carter Administration by a group of conservatives inclined to "look for reds under their beds." At that time their connection with Ronald Reagan, who had not won the Republican Party nomination for the presidency yet, did not attract any attention. The fact that Reagan's ambivalence toward the Central American capitals to contact the leaders of the Armed Forces of Washington and to give them generous promises of increased aid on behalf of their home if he should be able to settle in the White House, was not publicized at that time either. Reagan himself received visitors from El Salvador, Guatemala and other countries of the subregion at that time and assisted them of his support.

the "Secret Document" is read and interpreted in a completely different way--and now that its recommendations have become the basis of the Republican administration's policy in Central America, and now that the escalation of U.S. interference in the affairs of the countries of this region is posing a real threat to their peace and security.

The possibility of an election victory by Ronald Reagan was one of the main reasons for the publication of a second document, entitled "A Unique View of El Salvador and Central America."<sup>2</sup> The study was prepared by a State Department task force on El Salvador and Central America and was submitted to the Carter Administration on 6 November 1980--that is, when it became obvious that the White House would have a new master. Under these conditions, the report could serve as a program of action for the administration of the defeated Democrats for only the 60 days of the transition period--just until Ronald Reagan's inauguration. Following the administration's instructions, the authors gave the report the form of an analysis of the personal views of officials from the U.S. State Department, National Security Council, Defense Department, CIA and several other agencies. These influential members of the Washington establishment decided to use this kind of official channel to express their personal misgivings and dissatisfaction with the futile involvement in a conflict reminiscent of the U.S. war in Southeast Asia. The opinions set forth in the document contradicted the policy pursued by its authors in their capacity as U.S. government officials, and this duality affected the content of the document.

The report stated that American policy toward El Salvador was at an impasse and that the United States was bound hand and foot by its support of a weak and unpopular regime in a position of international isolation; a similar situation had taken shape in relations with Guatemala; American contacts with the reactionary military clique in Honduras, to which the United States has assigned the role of subregional policeman, were in acute conflict with the nationwide democratic, antimilitarist and anticollaborist movement in this country; Washington was out of step in taking the broad international support for Sandinist liberation into account. The authors also noted that Mexico and some other Latin American countries did not agree with all or part of Washington's actions in the Caribbean basin; they pointed out the inevitability of conflicts over Cuba between the government and the American people if the United States could withstand direct intervention in Central America.

The authors of this document felt that the situation could be corrected by the "normalization" of the Salvadoran crisis. This primarily signified recognition of the Democratic Revolutionary Front and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation, which have been fighting against the pro-American regime and are a representative political force. They advocated the rejection of "interventionism"--that is, of interventionist plans--and advised Washington to continue the talks between the Salvadoran Government and the patriots, as Washington had been discredited too much by its support of reactionary forces in this country. In this way, according to the authors, the United States could effectively promote the establishment of a "pluralist democratic regime" in the country and thereby keep circles loyal to Washington active in Salvadoran politics. Although they were blinded enough by their anti-communism to call for the "restoration of Soviet and Cuban intervention" in Central America



and painted a "frightening picture" of the waves of "internationalist anarchy," acting on orders from the Kremlin, rolling "across the isthmus from Colombia to the Mexican border," their point of view essentially representing a realistic alternative to the shameless expansionism of the "Committee on Santa Fe." President J. Carter, however, did not agree to any changes in U.S. policy allowing U.S. interference in El Salvador.

Social commentators have correctly noted<sup>5</sup> that this "inconsistency" corroborates Lenin's well-known thesis that the bourgeoisie "develops two systems of government and two methods of struggle for its own interests and in defense of its own supremacy. These two methods are used either alternately or in various combinations. The first is the method of violence, the method of refusing to make any kind of concessions to the labor movement, the method of suppressing all old and outdated institutions and the method of the intransigent rejection of reforms.... The second method is the method of 'liberalism,' of going in the direction of broader political rights, in the direction of reforms and concessions and so forth."<sup>6</sup>

The United States' relations with its southern neighbors clearly illustrate the truth and accuracy of V. I. Lenin's analysis. The events of the two past decades provide ample proof of this. The liberal reformism of the "New Frontier" policy certainly did not keep President J. Kennedy from sanctioning the intervention against Cuba that ended in such a disgraceful failure in the Bay of Pigs. The invasion of the Dominican Republic under President L. Johnson completely buried the myth, engendered for the gullible by the "Alliance for Progress," that the United States has abandoned the "big stick" policy. President R. Nixon offered the Latin Americans an "equal partnership" within the framework of the "New Dialogue" but simultaneously sanctioned the operations dreamed up by H. Kissinger for the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. J. Carter waged a "campaign for human rights," during the course of which halfhearted criticism of terrorist regimes evolved into support for the bloody dictatorship in El Salvador and the active U.S. interference in the civil war in this country began.

The Reagan Administration has been even more frank in declaring its expansionist plans for all of Latin America. Central America is the main target of American imperialism. The United States is willing and able to take virtually any steps to prevent the victory of revolutionary forces in El Salvador and Guatemala, to isolate Nicaragua in the subregion and in the Western Hemisphere in general, if not in the entire world, to undermine the position of the Sandinistas within the country and, finally, to stop the spread of socialist ideas' influence in Central America.

For this purpose, the Reagan Administration, as noted previously, took the path recommended by the "Santa Feans," although it also undertook some diplomatic maneuvers to renovate the facade of the regimes in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador and to make them resemble "representative bourgeois democracy" as much as possible. Washington needed this as the propaganda foundation for its new interventionist plans: It is easier to give military and political assistance to bloody dictatorships disguised as "democracies" than to discredited juntas whose evil deeds are known to the entire world.

The beginning of this operation dates back to Carter's rise, in 1980, when "loyalist" militarists loyal to the United States took the wheel of state in Honduras as a result of Washington's efforts to quell the popular antimilitarist movement in the country. The top army leaders moved into the background, where they were able to recover from the wounds inflicted by the laboring public. The militarists did retain, however, the right of autonomy in relations with the United States. Taking advantage of this, Washington began to turn the Honduran army into its own policeman in the subregion.

These attempts to "democratize" the dictatorships were much more vigorous in 1982. Presidential elections were held in Guatemala at the beginning of March and elections for the Salvadoran "constituent assembly" were held at the end of that month. The Washington-inspired game of democracy was stopped, however. The late president of Guatemala was unable to take office because the falsification of ballots was so flagrant; a hastily organized military coup changed the results of the scandalous election campaign. In El Salvador the elections were essentially army operations to herd the population into the polling booths and then were accompanied by the same brand of counterfeit ballots. As a result, the government was taken over by rabid "ultras" whose misanthropic views Washington is incapable of disguising.

As usual, the U.S. political actions were backed up by the appropriate dollar allocations. In fiscal year 1981 alone, the Salvadoran rulers were offered 180 million dollars; military and economic aid to the rulers of Guatemala was resumed (11.6 million dollars) and Honduras was allocated 50 million dollars (more than in the last 20 years).<sup>5</sup> As always, Washington publicized its "concern" for the needs of these countries, implying that its sops would somehow improve the state of their economy. This was exactly how President Ronald Reagan acted when he put forth the so-called "Caribbean Initiative" in OAS headquarters in February 1982.

In essence, this "initiative" can be described in the following manner: The United States is willing to develop trade relations with the countries of the subregion, promote the investment of American capital there and offer these countries economic "aid," but certainly not for unselfish reasons. In particular, the countries would be expected to participate in the anticommunist "crusade" for which the current Republican administration has been appealing since the first days of its existence.

In July Ronald Reagan repeated these proposals at a breakfast attended by representatives of the U.S. business community. At that time a lobbyist group of businessmen was formed--a "coalition in support of the Caribbean Initiative" with the aim of promoting economic aid to the countries of this zone. The fact that the coalition was headed by D. Rockefeller and F. Berman (once an African astronaut and now the president of Eastern Airlines, one of the largest American air lines) indicates whose interests the coalition represents.

What was the result of Reagan's "initiative" for the people of Central America?

First of all, the CIA's covert subversive operations against Nicaragua were adjusted. At the end of 1981 the CIA allocated 20 million dollars for the

...of a counterrevolutionary attack force, operating against the Sandinista government from the territory of Honduras. Around 4,500 of Somoza's former agents, criminals and counterrevolutionary refugees from Nicaragua are now in the payroll of various American special services.<sup>6</sup> The 700 kilometers of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border have become a frontline, which the Sandinist army is forced to defend against constant invasions by reactionary gangs acting with the official connivance of the Honduran authorities and with the blessings of the United States. The American embassy in Honduras has turned into something like a headquarters for the coordination of U.S. covert and overt operations in Central America. Washington has also exerted constant pressure on Guatemala to force this country to follow Honduras' example. American military advisers have been sent back to Guatemala and are active in El Salvador.

The victory of the revolution in Nicaragua dealt a fatal blow to the so-called Central American Defense Council (CONDECA), which had performed the functions of a "staffhead" of American imperialism in the subregion. Washington quickly put together a new military-political bloc, which was joined in 1982 by Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador, and later by Guatemala. It was given a name quite in line with the hypocritical policy of the White House--the Central American Democratic Community (CADC). According to Washington's plans, the CADC was supposed to straighten out Nicaragua and stop the growth of the counterrevolutionary movement in the countries of the isthmus.

The creation of aggressive military blocs is a favorite tactic of Ronald Reagan's "East Team" associates. This is also attested to by the recent acquisition in the Caribbean of another of this policy's offspring--a "regional security force" made up of the armed forces of the East Caribbean countries. Great Britain took an active part in the creation of this military organization along with the United States. In light of Washington's recent support of the English conservative government's policy at the time of the crisis over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, this case of American-British cooperation shows how little imperialism cares about the interests of the countries the United States is trying to unite in some kind of "community of the Western Hemisphere" and whose interests it pretends to defend.

The "regional security force" is supposed to serve as a barrier to isolate the island states in the region of the Greater and Lesser Antilles, and as a "flexible force". It is expected to put an end to the genuine people's government established on the island of Grenada in 1979 by the New Jewel Movement and to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas to other Caribbean islands. The strategic support of the two military-political blocs is provided by this Latin American version of the "rapid deployment force" and is covered by the Caribbean Operational Unit created in 1979 and converted into a regional command in December 1981 (with its headquarters in Key West, Florida).

In December 1982 Ronald Reagan toured several Latin American countries. He visited Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras. In view of the present state of affairs, the itinerary had to include Central America. Reagan encountered the first difficulties of this tour even before he entered the subregion. In the Colombian capital of Bogota, he ran into something close to an affront from the new president of this country, Betancur. The head of the Colombian state frankly told the President that the resolution of problems

...and the United States would remain neutral, and not intervene in the internal affairs of any country and Nicaragua for everything.

A warm local reception awaited Ronald Reagan in Costa Rica and Honduras, where he aligned with the leaders of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan regimes. The new master of the White House generously "forgave the sins" of Guatemala's military junta and El Salvador's "Provisional" President Maguerra by calling them "democrats to the core." The President of the United States promised them, as well as Honduran President Cordova, political support and military assistance. He was unable, however, to gain wholehearted support for his own anti-communist policy from the Costa Ricans.<sup>6</sup> It is indicative that the United States' first major action in the subregion following the President's arrival in Central America was a set of joint American-Honduran maneuvers, conducted for defensive purposes near the Nicaraguan border at the beginning of 1981.

The Reagan Administration's political adventures were thwarted by unexpected opposition. All of the successive attempts to take reprisals against the Sandinist regime failed. In fact, the Sandinist government is winning increasing support both within the country and in the international arena. One indicator of this was witnessed at the 37th session of the UN General Assembly, when the Cuban delegation nominated Nicaragua as their regional temporary member of the Security Council.

The nature of the struggle in El Salvador has been just as disconcerting for the United States, as evidenced in Washington. The patriots of this long-standing conflict still hold the strategic initiative in the civil war, despite the military, economic and political aid its reactionary rulers have received from the United States.

The growing intensity of class struggle in Honduras is frustrating the local military establishment's attempts at active interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states in the capacity of a subregional policeman—a role which it wanted it to play. In Guatemala public dissatisfaction has evolved into partisan warfare against the terrorist military junta. Under these conditions, although the national reformist leaders of Costa Rica allowed their country to be drawn into the CADC, they are in no hurry to become involved in Washington's anti-Nicaraguan adventures. As for the CADC itself, as soon as it made its appearance it was being compared to "a snake striped with only two black bands."<sup>7</sup> At that time it resided at Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador, which was the broken leg of the defective tripod. Its stability was not improved when Guatemala joined the community a little while later.

It is hard to believe that the method of violence, to which the Republican Government has tried to resort in order to strengthen its own position in Central America, will produce the results anticipated in Washington. There was no respite for the semblance of calm on the border in 1982 and 1983, which further led to new waves of preparations for a new, even more aggressive anti-communist intervention in Central American affairs. At this time, it has become well known that the plans of the "Lima IV Document" were no longer considered satisfactory to the White House. For example, Assistant U.S.

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs T. Under repeatedly mentioned the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Salvadoran crisis in his statements, referring to possible negotiations between the authorities in Guatemala and members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, representing national forces in the country. The same types of statements were made by members of the present Salvadoran regime--"Provisional" President Magana and "Defense Minister," General Garcia, Salvadoran minister of defense (who was dismissed from this office in April of this year for the defeats suffered by his government troops he headed).

The results of voting 1981 proved, however, that Washington had resolved to pursue its anti-communist September and its tough line in the subregion. In March 1981 President Reagan requested Congress twice to approve additional appropriations in the amount of 110 million dollars in the current year and 20 million in the next year, fiscal year 1984, for military aid to El Salvador.<sup>10</sup> and it was assumed that more American military "advisers" would be sent to El Salvador.

and it is clear that we must understand the real reasons for the intensification of the struggle against the system of imperialist oppression and do not believe that these are internal in nature, stemming from the maintenance of the authoritarian structures and outdated forms of economic management and consequently oppression in Central America. They regard the revolutionary aspirations of the popular masses in these countries as the result of the penetration of "Marxist-Leninism," directed by "the hand of the Kremlin." They believe that the struggle is against the "red menace." But in today's world the "red menace" are usually unable to contain the pressure of revolutionary forces.

The success of socialist construction in Cuba and the victory of the people in Nicaragua are serving as tangible points of reference in the struggle of the fighting masses of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.

There is growing increasing animosity in imperialist circles in the Western world's imperialist nations.

It was this animosity that permeated the recently published report of the planning committee of the U.S. National Security Council on American policy in Central America and Cuba up to the end of fiscal year 1984.<sup>11</sup> The contents of this document, compiled more than a year ago, are particularly interesting because they provide a basis for the comparison of White House words and actions.

The outline of the report stated that clear tendencies toward a stronger coalition of hardline Nicaragua and increased influence for Cuba were apparent in the Central American subregion. In connection with this, the planning staff recommended more intense covert subversive actions against these countries and advised that these actions be camouflaged with a broad propaganda campaign in order to win Latin American and West European support for Washington's policy in Central America. As the document stressed, however, the United States could attain its goals only if the regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala, which depend on military, political and economic assistance from Washington, could gain a stronger position.



According to the authors, the attainment of U.S. military goals in Central America up to the end of fiscal year 1984 will require almost a billion dollars a year in allocations to prop up the Salvadoran and Guatemalan regimes, to bolster the military potential of the Honduran Army--the United States' position in the subregion--and to make the CADC more effective and finance subversive activity against Nicaragua and Cuba.

The contents of the NSM report accord completely with the ideas set forth in the "Santa Fe Document." What is more, they have been reflected in the actions of the Reagan administration during the year since its publication.

The "dramatic" statements by White House leaders that El Salvador would soon fall into "communist hands" marked the beginning of the latest round of unabated American interference in subregional affairs. This was the essence of statements made by the above-mentioned T. Enders, Secretary of State G. Shultz and General Nutting, commander of the U.S. Southern Command. These statements reinforced J. Fitzpatrick's announcement, made after her trip to El Salvador in March, that the pro-American regime would not last long without immediate outside assistance.<sup>12</sup>

A media campaign was launched to promote the extension of additional military aid to the Salvadoran rulers. It was accompanied by a large-scale invasion of Honduras by Marxist bandits, trained with U.S. aid. The two actions were interconnected and revealed the aggressive essence of Yankee policy in Central America, which was intensifying the crisis in this part of the Western Hemisphere.

While hearings flared up in Washington over the weakness of the puppet government and the uncertainties of congressional approval of additional U.S. credit to El Salvador, the counterrevolutionary invasion by the army trained by the CIA and the hostility of Honduras was being kindled. These CIA actions were contrary to the November 1982 resolution of the American Congress, prohibiting the financing of any activity aimed at undermining the Sandinist government in Nicaragua or at escalating the Honduran-Nicaraguan conflict. But this did not prevent President Reagan and his associates, who had actually directed the actions of the invading forces through something like a headquarters known as "Joint Inter-ordinating committee," the members of which include representatives of the CIA and the U.S. Southern Command. In Honduras the actions of the committee are overseen by the American ambassador to this country, J. Negroni.

At the same time, the White House undertook a diplomatic assault on Mexico for the support of Nicaragua and progressive forces in El Salvador. But when U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz visited Mexico in the middle of April, he was unable to convince the Mexicans to give up the realistic policy they are pursuing in consultation with Venezuela, Colombia and Panama with regard to events in Central America. The Mexican Government announced that it would continue adhering to the position of the "Contadora group," created at the beginning of 1983, and at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama on the Venezuelan island of Contadora.

During this meeting, representatives from these four countries expressed their worries about the escalation of U.S. interference in the affairs of Central

...where a seat of international tension had come into being and could grow into an armed conflict. The "Contadora group" condemned U.S. interventionist plans, supported the right of the Central American people to independent development and social progress and advocated the settlement of all disputes between states of the subregion by means of negotiation.<sup>13</sup>

This was the aim of the group's proposal that a meeting of the foreign ministers of all five Central American states be held in the Honduran capital, Tegucigalpa, in April of this year, with representatives from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama in attendance. The meeting was unproductive because the Salvadoran and Guatemalan dictatorships and the governments of Honduras and Costa Rica, invited by Washington, remained deaf to the peaceful proposals of Nicaragua and the Contadora states.

It must be said that all of the political propaganda spread by the American administration in connection with the crisis it had incited on the Central American isthmus did not deceive anyone, not even the American legislators. This was particularly apparent during the April debates in the U.S. Congress when the allocation of 50 million additional dollars to the Salvadoran regime in military aid in the current fiscal year was being considered. The Democratic majority in the House of Representatives took a skeptical view of the Republican administration's adventures in Central America, calling them a new 1960's version of the anti-Cuban action in the Bay of Pigs that ended in such a disastrous failure in 1961.<sup>14</sup>

To attain its goal, the White House inundated the congressmen with all sorts of assurances, reaffirming its noble intention to found a "democracy" in El Salvador on American money. Ronald Reagan even appointed a special emissary, J. Stone, to oversee the establishment of "democracy" in El Salvador under the present puppet dictatorship. The criteria by which Stone will be guided in his activity can already be judged because he has already spent a long time in Washington representing a lobbyist group working in the interests of the successive dictatorial regimes in Guatemala.

But the main argument in favor of additional military aid to the regime in El Salvador was Reagan's speech about U.S. policy in Central America at a joint session of the House of Representatives and Senate. By tradition, presidents speak at joint sessions of the Congress only in extreme situations, when they must discuss problems pertaining to U.S. security. Only in this way, by artificially creating a turmoil over the imaginary "communist terrorist aggression" in the subregion, was Ronald Reagan able to save the plans of his administration from total failure.

The additional U.S. aid to the Salvadoran rulers was approved, although in an amount cut to 30 million dollars. This reaffirmed the duality of the political outlook of the American bourgeois establishment's so-called liberal wing, to which many Democratic congressmen belong. Class solidarity caused them to make an obviously halfhearted decision against their own common sense, which told them that the escalation of U.S. intervention in Central America would lead to a repetition of the Bay of Pigs incident. As a result, almost immediately after Reagan's address in the Congress, Somozaist gangs supported by

similar situation with White House another broad-based survey of Nicaragua in 1981. It is true that a select House committee on intelligence approved a resolution in 1981 which prohibited the CIA from aiding armed formations seeking to overthrow the Sandinist government. This is far from the first conclusion of its kind, however, and is not so much a restriction of White House activity as it is a confirmation of its participation in the intervention against Nicaragua.

More than half a century ago Augusto Cesar Sandino, the national hero of Nicaragua, warned that Yankee imperialism, the Latin American people's most deadly enemy, sought to put an end to their national dignity and liberty. The content of the White House's present Central American policy proves that nothing has changed in the last 50 years. The Reagan Administration is now trying to justify its interventionist line with the need for struggle for the "values of Western civilization" against the expansion of "communist ideology." But these general statements quite often precede more specific and misleading explanations that the United States' "fourth border" supposedly runs through the territory of the independent states of Central America. Consequently, the struggle of the people of this subregion for their rights, in Washington's opinion, undermines U.S. security.

This thoroughly false thesis was exposed at the recent international conference of the Nicaraguan capital of Managua on "The Peace and Sovereignty of the Peoples of Central America and the Caribbean." Conference speakers, supporters of peace from Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe, stressed that poverty and unemployment, and not the "hand of the Kremlin," are the reason for the revolutionary struggle by the popular masses of the subregion. When Carlos Ruiz Vilard, chairman of the Nicaraguan State Council and member of the FMLN political leadership, addressed the peace forum in Managua, he said that the United States must realize the senselessness of the war it is financing in Central America.

History is proving once again that American imperialism did not heed its own lessons: it learned in Cuba, Vietnam and Iran. People in Washington do not want to understand what happened in Nicaragua and what is now happening throughout Central America. All of this will inevitably make the situation in the region more explosive, and this is certainly not in the national interest of the United States.

#### FOOTNOTES

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11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 April 1983.
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## AMERICAN NEOCOLONIALISM: THE MONOPOLIES AND THE 'TRANSFER' OF TECHNOLOGY

Review SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed in press 17 Jun 83) pp 31-42

[Article by R. I. Zimenkov]

[Text] The seventh conference of the heads of state and government of the assigned countries (New Delhi, March 1983), the sixth session of UNCTAD--the UN Conference on Trade and Development (Belgrade, June 1983) and several other recent forums and events have once again directed the attention of the international community and all people of the world to the developing countries' struggle to consolidate their political independence and economic self-sufficiency and their fight for a new international economic order. Questions connected with the technology trade between the developed capitalist powers, particularly the United States, and the developing countries are acquiring an increasingly important place in this struggle.

The profound progressive changes in many young states, their struggle against oppression and exploitation by American and world imperialism and the actual discrediting of imperialist ideology and practices in the former colonies and dependencies have all motivated the United States to continue using its old, traditional methods of the economic subjugation of the emerging nations (the export of capital, "aid," trade and others) and also to find and make extensive use of new ways and means of keeping these countries in a dependent position in the world capitalist economy. It is within this context that we should examine the energetic U.S. attempts to make use of technological superiority and of scientific and technical achievements in the exploitation of these countries by American capital, especially the transnational corporations. It is not surprising that this policy is called "technological neocolonialism."<sup>1</sup> Its chief purpose is the formation and maintenance of a system of economic relations between imperialist and developing states in the commercial transfer of equipment and technology to the latter which will secure their technological dependence in the strategic interests of present-day neocolonialism. Therefore, this phenomenon is essentially part of the total strategy of neocolonialism in its present form.<sup>2</sup> The continuous technological revolution is making "technological neocolonialism" an increasingly important way of attaining Western economic and political goals in the developing countries.

To this end, the West is making energetic use of the huge scientific and technical base separating imperialism from its economic periphery. The U.S. snare

The total research and development expenditures of all capitalist countries is one percent of GNP, for example, while the combined share of the Asian, African and Latin American countries is less than 1 percent. In 1981, U.S. R&D expenditures totaled 69.1 billion dollars, or 2.37 percent of the GNP, while the expenditures of the developing countries were just slightly over 5.5 billion dollars, or 0.3 percent of their combined GNP.<sup>3</sup> There is also a wide gap between supplies of scientific personnel and engineers. At the beginning of the 1950's there were 604 scientists and engineers engaged in R&D for every 100,000 inhabitants in the United States, while the figure for the developing countries was only 10.

These countries are striving to overcome their technological and economic underdevelopment, particularly through the acquisition and incorporation of foreign scientific and technical achievements. American imperialism is trying to take advantage of this in order to bind the newly liberated countries more closely to its own technological potential and to the U.S. economy. It is placing increasing emphasis on broad-scale technological expansion in these countries with the use of transnational corporations--the biggest suppliers of modern technology in the West and the chief partners of the developing states in the trade in patents, licenses, trademarks, equipment and consulting services. Around half of all of the international capitalist trade in technology now consists in transactions between transnational corporations and their branches in the developing countries. Furthermore, it is American companies that dominate the field, accounting for around 66 percent of all revenues from the export of technology from developed capitalist states to the liberated countries.<sup>4</sup> The role of these corporations in commercial technology transfers has grown ever more important in recent years, particularly now that the Reagan Administration is encouraging private capital in every way possible and is trying to stimulate private investments in developing countries and activity of American monopolies abroad.

Of course, the effects of this corporate activity have been varied. On the one hand, by conducting research and development projects, organizing the production of science-intensive goods and transmitting technology to several countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the transnational corporations are helping to raise the level of their technical and economic development. On the other hand, this progress "is accompanied, just as all other types of capitalist progress, by the 'progress' of contradictions--that is, by their exacerbation and spread."<sup>5</sup> The "transfer" of technology and its use in the developing countries are conducted in the corporations' own interest and are aimed at the accumulation of superprofits. They are binding these countries to the U.S. economy by creating a new type of technological dependence and by controlling the establishment and development of their national economies. It is no secret that the transnational corporations are striving to channel this development in capitalist directions.

The technological expansion of American transnational corporations in the developing countries is supported by the government. The direct forms of its economic support are negligible, but the arsenal of indirect forms is extremely diversified. broader activity by the government Overseas Private Investment Corporation, promoting the flow of direct investments to the developing



...which have interorganizational shipments, technology is still to be effective in developing countries during later stages of the "life cycle" of the product or technological process--that is, when there is a drop in the export demand for types of technology that are already being used and are no longer new.

Furthermore, whereas the TNC's provide their branches with a continuous supply of innovations, interorganizational shipments are always isolated events. To obtain such, the attainment of more advanced technology, or its "second generation," must be negotiated with the corporations, which do not always agree to this condition because they fear competition from the partner. Finally, when the TNC's transfer technology to companies not under their control, they often utilize and make extensive use of all possible restrictions, particularly the limitation or prohibition of the licensee's export operations, in order to integrate partners in the corporation's own global sales network. Consequently, although national enterprises do receive technology directly through interorganizational channels and can make use of it in their own industry, the specific terms of the transfer reduce its final impact.

Moreover, TNC's usually transfer technology either directly, in its "pure" form, or in combination with machines, equipment, instruments and other physical elements. As a rule, however, the forms and methods of technology transfer are not mutually exclusive and are most often combined in various ways.

One type of "combination" commercial technology transfers consists in scientific machines, equipment and other types of industrial products. Such exports of machines and equipment to the developing countries are increasing rapidly, primarily due to the industrialization efforts of many of these countries. Between 1970 and 1981 these exports more than quadrupled--amounting to 4 billion dollars.<sup>8</sup> At the end of the 1970's these countries accounted for 38 percent of all exports of machines and equipment from the United States and 60 percent of the U.S. positive balance of trade in science-technology products.

Of course, these countries derive certain benefits from the purchase of equipment as a means of obtaining new technology. For example, they do not have to develop industrial potential which does not meet the requirements of their national economy.

Nevertheless, the transfer of technology through foreign trade channels has several negative implications for the developing countries. In general, the TNC's have no interest in the efficient use of technology transferred in this manner. Their prices do not depend directly on the results of the use of this technology in production. The client must bear all of the risk and expenditures connected with the incorporation of new equipment. Furthermore, even if the transaction involves no restrictions on the importer of equipment patented by an American firm, the patent actually means that the seller can dictate his own terms for the future use of the equipment to the buyer. The degree of seller control depends on the buyer's ability to acquire equipment from other sources.

The domination of the world capitalist market by Americans and other monopolies means that enterprises in the developing countries are dependent on them for

...of other elements of technology and credit for the purchase of equipment and, in some cases, must pay artificially inflated prices. Finally, technology's attempts to use various trade restrictions, sanctions and embargos in its own political interest have a negative effect on technology transfers, and this kind of behavior in trade with the developing countries is becoming a common feature of the current U.S. administration.

The world of engineering services occupies a position midway between the "pure" and "contaminated" forms of technology transfer. These are various engineering and consulting services which are a commercial item and are used by the client to finance capital investments connected with a technical project--the construction of a new facility or the modernization of an existing one. The "contaminated" can include either the entire set of services connected with project planning and construction or one or several elements of the set. The buyer of these services is generally also granted the right to use patented designs, technological processes and expertise. On the other hand, licensed technological processes can dictate the purchase of engineering services.

Engineering companies generally fall into one of two categories--consulting and construction engineering firms. The first set up the initial effort and are contracted for services without any subsequent delivery of equipment or performance of construction operations. These firms have been most active in Latin America and the Middle East. At the beginning of the 1980's, for example, around 150 such firms were operating in the Middle East, mainly in connection with the stepped-up development of the oil, gas refining and petrochemical industries here.

For construction engineering firms, these fairly powerful branches of services usually perform all of the services connected with the planning of industrial and other facilities and with the actual construction work, the delivery, installation and adjustment of equipment and the start-up of facilities. In other words, they provide the "final product" or a facility "ready for operation." They are also able to offer their clients long-term financing. These firms have considerable operational volume in the developing countries (about 60 percent of all their foreign orders). Between 1975 and 1980, the income share of the 100 largest construction engineering firms in the United States increased 2.9-fold and amounted to 34 billion dollars.<sup>9</sup> One of them, the Bechtel company, began the planning and construction of eight petroleum refineries at a cost of over 800 million dollars in the young states in 1980, 10 of the Bechtel company signed contracts with Saudi Arabia for the construction of several large industrial complexes at a cost of 35 billion dollars and between 1976 and 1981.<sup>10</sup>

The world of engineering services opens its door for U.S. corporations to conduct for developing countries and export spare machines and equipment to these markets. Besides this, the export of engineering services into the economies of the developing countries goes closely to American technical assistance and standards and to the U.S. standard. Finally, inflationary pressures in the United States have brought about a dramatic rise in the cost of construction of various facilities in the developing countries by American firms. Furthermore, these countries are subject to huge overpayments



because American corporations deliberately jack up the prices of projects. This is being practiced on such a broad scale that several countries have had to take special measures to guard against the rising costs of industrial construction projects by Western companies. For example, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Qatar and Bahrain have agreed to exchange information about the project pricing practices of American and other Western firms. Dishonest firms will be "blacklisted" and will not be allowed to participate in development projects.

The export of management and organization methods, which has recently become an important form of economic relations between U.S. firms and the developing states, is the main type of transfer of technology and production experience in "pure" form. This is connected with the increasingly important role of management and organization in securing the effectiveness of modern production.

The export of management and organization methods by American firms generally takes the form of management contracts, consulting services and assistance in the creation of managerial training systems. The practice of concluding management contracts between American corporations and industrial or other local companies in which the corporations have no ownership rights is growing more popular. This is the transfer of managerial expertise in "pure" form, it is "enterprise without capital," it is trade in knowledge and experience. A firm taking on management functions in another company receive regular payments for these services. This new form of business is connected with the greater role of management in the era of technological revolution, with restrictions on the import of capital in many developing countries and with the possibility that the property of American monopolies might be nationalized. As the HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW commented, "direct investments through traditional channels do not accord with the realities of the changing balance of power and...the danger of political risk dictates a transfer from quick profits to the less profitable but more stable service contract."

Management contracts give the contracted firm profits from management operations and income from the sale of the equipment it recommends for the enterprise, as well as additional opportunities to penetrate new markets, access to various sources of raw materials, etc. Furthermore, the contracted firm which manages an enterprise in which it does not have ownership rights effectively escapes the risk connected with investments but can control enterprise operations. This practice is particularly widespread in the petroleum and mining industries in the developing countries, especially in Venezuela, Mexico, Panama and a number of states in the Middle East.<sup>12</sup>

Consulting services in organization and administration play a special role in the export of management from the United States. Consulting firms draw up plans on a commercial basis and help companies in the developing countries incorporate new management methods. In contrast to the management contracts, which are generally connected with the establishment of enterprises, technical services and consultations in the sphere of administration presuppose the functioning of an existing enterprise. Besides this, the local company manages its enterprise independently. These agreements, which are called "franchises," are widely used in retail trade, public catering, the hotel industry, airport services, vehicle rental, etc. For example, Trans World

Exxon, a large American air transport company, has offered its administrative services to several air lines in the developing countries and has thereby gained an opportunity to penetrate their air transport markets and earn huge profits. Franchising allows American TNC's to avoid the expenditures and risk that generally accompany investments abroad, to earn large profits and to control a large portion of this part of the service sphere in several young states.

Such action in the organization of management training systems is another way in which administrative expertise is exported from the United States to the developing countries. This usually takes the form of the transmission of knowledge and experience to specialists who come to the United States. Many American universities and colleges admit and train foreigners for this purpose. One of the underlying motives here is that the American TNC's are interested in employing administrative personnel from the developing countries who have acquired the necessary skills and education to work in corporate branches in the young states. Besides this, by training specialists from the young states, the United States is striving to create an internal social basis of support in these countries, which can be used to promote American influence and foreign policy ideology and policy.

To realize the impact of the training of managerial personnel from these countries and to adapt the system to local conditions, American corporations, universities and charitable foundations aid the developing states in the organization of special managerial training centers for instruction in the latest administrative methods. These centers include, for example, the School of Business Administration in Sao Paulo (Brazil), the Higher School of Business in Lima (Peru), the Institute of Higher Learning in Administration (Ivory Coast), the business administration departments of the universities of Malacca and Singapore and the School of Business Administration of the University of Lagos (Nigeria). American firms and specialists participating in the creation and operation of these centers derive a high income from this work. This also gives them a unique opportunity to learn the distinctive features of the economy of each country.

Both corporations transferring management experience to the developing countries also derive considerable financial advantages. It is indicative that licenses, expertise and patents account for only one-fourth of the payments of branches of TNC companies for the services of their parent firms; but that the payments for the latest managerial methods and other similar services. In 1981, for example, the payments of branches in these countries to their parent firms in the United States totaled 1.331 billion dollars (including 167 million for licenses), while payments for the latest management methods and other services of this type totaled 773 million dollars.<sup>14</sup>

Finally, another way of transmitting technology in its "pure" form is the licensing agreement of the American corporation. In international practice, these agreements can encompass several types of rights and services. American firms often, however, try to sell rights to the use of patents, expertise and so forth separately. Only in rare cases, when circumstances are induced by the gradual development of the scientific and technical potential of young

driven by competition from other Western firms, do American TNC's offer a "package" of various rights and services in license agreements, similar to the practice of American corporations in the developed capitalist states. License agreements generally contain many stipulations which transgress the bounds of normal business practice and restrict the sovereignty of developing countries: "conditional purchase" (the sale of technology is conditional upon client orders for materials, equipment and spare parts from a firm specified by the seller of the technology); a partial or total ban on exports of products manufactured on the basis of the license; restrictions on the import of goods that might compete with the products of the company selling the technology; the appointment of Americans representing the licensing firm to managerial positions.

Interest in licensing by American corporations is also stimulated by other factors. The sale of licenses is sometimes preferable to direct capital investment. Some of these factors are the chance to sell unused technology and to penetrate largely inaccessible sales markets, the shortage of the available investment capital and skilled manpower required for the organization of industries in the developing countries, and the political risks of investments in some young states.

At the beginning of the 1980's all of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America accounted for only around 20 percent of all U.S. overseas license agreements. The sectorial structure of these agreements reflects the desire of American monopolies to penetrate the most rapidly developing sphere of the economy of these countries--the processing industry (accounting for more than 60 percent of all agreements), particularly machine building, electrical engineering, instrument making and the chemical industry--that is, precisely the modern industries in which TNC control can ensure the future economic development of this group of countries in the interests of the corporations.

Typically, in their relations with developing countries the American TNC's use various means and methods for the "transfer" of scientific, technical, production and managerial knowledge and experience. No matter what specific forms it might take, however, the policy of the American TNC's is aimed at the accumulation of profits from the exploitation of foreign labor, which is cheaper than U.S. labor, with the aid of modern equipment, at increasing their own exports of manufactured goods and at taking over the markets of the developing countries--in short, at the further intensification of foreign economic expansion.

#### Consequences

American exports of technology to the developing countries have not brought about an appreciable rise in the level of their scientific and technical development and have not led to their attainment of economic independence. On the contrary, in the multistructured economy of these countries they have contributed to the creation of enclaves of modern industrial production with only a weak connection to the national economy. Finally, they have created a new form of dependence--a technological form that supplements and reinforces economic dependence.

On this issue, the negative effects of American TNC's on the economies of the Asian, African and Latin American countries are reflected, above all, in the restriction of their possibilities for scientific and technical development through restrictive monopolistic practices; secondly, in the deformed technological structure of their economies; thirdly, in their industrial specialization in accordance with the interests of monopoly capital.

On restrictive monopolistic practices in the sphere of technology transfer have already been researched in scientific literature.<sup>18</sup> We will simply note in brief that they include the restriction of the licensee's production and exports, the obligation of the licensee to purchase spare parts and related equipment only from the licensor, the restriction of further research and of the employment of specialists not recommended by the exporter of the technology, the limitation of the adaptation of technology to local conditions, the obligation of the importer to acquire unnecessary additional goods and services, the restriction of the use of technology after the expiration of the contract, etc.

The abuse of monopoly power are cogently attested to just by the restrictive contractual practices with regard to the TNC's rights of ownership to patents and trademarks in the developing countries. The TNC's make extensive use of trademarks to jack up the prices of products marketed under the label of a TNC industrial or commercial firm. According to a special study, for example, in the Philippines the prices of medications with TNC labels are jacked up by more than 2,000 percent in comparison to the prices of equivalent medicines from local enterprises. Besides this, the TNC's abuse ownership rights to trademarks in order to divide markets in developing countries among themselves and maintain a wide range of prices in these markets in order to increase their profits. In Indonesia, for example, branches of American pharmaceutical firms sell tetracycline at prices approximately 10 times as high as world prices and their prices for ampicillin were 2.4 times as high; the prices of 12 brand audio components for television sets were 2.5 times as high and the prices of semiconductors were 11 times as high. A paper-making machine costing 800,000 dollars was sold in this country for 1.2 million. Similar cases were discovered in India, Mexico, Costa Rica and the Philippines.

Furthermore, the technology transferred to developing countries within the framework of TNC production complexes generally performs only a few production operations (usually the initial or final stage). This means that the functioning of production facilities here is deliberately made wholly dependent on the headquarters of American corporations. In this way, they effectively insure themselves against the consequences of nationalization, since enterprises with an incomplete production cycle remain dependent on American capital and technology for a long time even after nationalization. This practice creates serious obstacles impeding the formation of efficient national economic conditions in the developing countries and perpetuates their activity on the periphery of world capitalist industry.

Thus, the technology transfer operations of American TNC's have a negative effect on the industrial specialization of the developing countries. Under these conditions, the West, particularly the United States, is no longer

process of restructuring the system of neocolonial exploitation based on the global division of labor and raw material specialization of these countries. One of imperialism's most important means of dominating them is its monopoly in science and technology. The mounting struggle of the developing countries for economic independence, however, has forced the United States and other advanced capitalist countries to modify the system of international capitalist division of labor. Now the TNC's are not only transferring obsolete and worn equipment and technology to the developing countries but are also moving production requiring high energy, labor and material expenditures to these countries, as well as production processes which are no longer an avenue of scientific and technical progress and are inclined to become a burden on the advanced capitalist economies (for example, enterprises with a negative ecological impact). By doing this, monopoly capital is pursuing quite specific and definite goals.<sup>15</sup>

The establishment of scientific schools and fields dependent on the United States is also having a negative effect on the scientific and technical potential of these countries because they are used to "filter out" the best ideas and scientific energy of the young states. The United States is using the following channels to establish this kind of dependence: the financing of research projects in the developing countries (with the terms depending on the political loyalty to the host countries to their American creditors and on the investment climate for TNC's); a personnel policy in which central staffs (or branches at the lowest levels) are made up of national specialists trained in the United States; the popularization of research theories and methods having no competition with the national requirements of developing countries; the adaptation of the advanced scientific infrastructure primarily with American equipment and specialists with professional ties to TNC's.

Renowned English economist P. Streeten analyzed this system, which has been termed "academic imperialism" in the West, he concluded that the ability of the economically underdeveloped countries to generate new ideas and conduct research on their own was being undermined by the actions of foreign specialists and that Western research practice in the developing states was intended to justify a neocolonial system of exploitation.<sup>16</sup> The system resulted in the rapid limitation of the functions of many specialized research services of TNC branches engaged in the adaptation of production processes to local conditions or raw material and product quality control.

In 1981 the income derived by American corporations directly from the transfer of scientific and technical knowledge to the developing countries exceeded 2.5 billion dollars.

The table shows that most of this income (87 percent in 1981) came from U.S. branches in the developing countries and only an insignificant portion (13 percent) came from foreign companies not controlled by TNC's. Obviously, increasing payments have a negative effect on the finances and economy of developing countries. The intraorganizational mechanism of technology transfer allows American TNC's to earn huge additional profits by evading the payment of taxes on part of their income. The price of the technology acquired by a particular country is often deliberately understated in branch accounts, while the real price of technology transferred to branches is recorded in the accounts of TNC



newspapers, which cannot be audited by tax agencies in the developing countries. This results in huge losses for the developing countries, putting an additional strain on their already strained, often negative payment balances and reducing their budget revenues.

Structure of U.S. Corporate Income from Sale of Technology to Developing Countries, millions of dollars

Source	1960	1965	1970	1975	1978	1979	1980	1981
Total	161	302	564	839	1,031	1,076	1,403	1,522
from branches and affiliates	135	270	486	734	886	913	1,227	1,331
from independent foreign firms	26	37	74	105	151	163	176	191

Calculated according to: SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, December 1973, p. 17; January 1980, pp. 34-35; August 1982, p. 19.

The direct income of American corporations from the transfer of technology to this group of countries is supplemented by payments for equipment "attached" to the technology by suppliers and sold at deliberately inflated prices. The total income of American corporations in this area was estimated at 25.2 billion dollars in 1981, or around 15 percent of all the capital invested by young states in fixed assets.<sup>12</sup>

Besides this, it should be borne in mind that American corporations usually understate their income from technology transfers, particularly with the aid of loopholes in the mechanism of accounts with branches and affiliates not subject to control at the developing states. All of this also allows the TNC's to conceal the scales of their actual exploitation of the young states with the aid of technology transfers. Furthermore, their concealed income is sometimes much greater than their direct revenues. The attempts of governments in several of these countries to block the channels for the illegal transfer of income have not had any perceptible effect as yet.

The newly liberated countries have an urgent need for patents, technical documents and production and managerial expertise and cannot refuse to import technology. This is why the struggle between these countries and the United States in this sphere revolves around the conditions of technology transfers, particularly the TNC "code of behavior" in this field.

According to the decisions of the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly (August 1980) and the Fifth UNCTAD Session (Manila, 1979), this code is supposed to contain provisions securing fair standards of technology transfer and excluding the possibility of inequality and restrictive business practices by monopolies in international transactions and in the exchange of technology between TNC's and their branches in the developing countries.

Although Washington has verbally acknowledged the right to choose technology for import and to adapt it and has agreed to cooperate with several regional countries in the transfer of technology, it has insisted that the main channel



of this transmission is the investment of TNC capital in the economies of the developing states. What is more, the United States believes that the code should be optional and should not extend to the operations of TNC branches in developing countries. Besides this, it is taking every opportunity to minimize the list of restrictive business practices that the code is supposed to regulate unilaterally.<sup>18</sup> As a result of the obstructionist U.S. position, the drafting of this code has not been completed. And while the debates go on, the losses of the developing countries and the profits of American corporations are growing.

The technological revolution could provide the young independent states with great opportunities for the modernization and development of their economies and could help them overcome their underdevelopment and eradicate hunger, disease, poverty and illiteracy. All of this is being impeded, however, by imperialism's selfish policy and by the dependence of the majority of developing countries on it. The opportunities created by the technological revolution are not being utilized in full. The huge monopolies of the United States and other developed capitalist countries have concentrated most of the scientific and technical potential of the capitalist world in their own hands and are using it for their own expansionist economic and political purposes.

Suppose this policy of "technological neocolonialism" did not encounter active resistance in the Asian, African and Latin American countries just 10-15 years ago, now it is exacerbating conflicts between these countries and the West. Many of these countries realize the true purpose of neocolonial strategy and are defending their own national interests by opposing "technological neocolonialism." The growing movement for nonalignment, which is anti-imperialist in nature, and scientific and technical cooperation among the young independent states are of great significance in their economic liberation and the consolidation of their political independence. The further expansion of cooperation by the developing countries with the USSR and other socialist states will promote this progress. The experience of recent years attests to the highly effective nature of relations based on equality and mutual benefit.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V. Znamenskiy, "The Joint Struggle of the Workers and National Liberation Movements Against Imperialism and for Social Progress," KOMMUNIST, 1980, No. 16, p. 34.
2. For more about this strategy, see, for example, M. Ya. Volkov, "American Neocolonialism in Its Present Form," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No. 12.
3. "Science Indicators 1980," Wash., 1981, pp. 210, 212, 248.
4. REPORT. NEWS AND VIEWS OF THE WORLD BANK, January-February 1980, p. 6.
5. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol. 2, p. 180.
6. See the article by E. Obminskiy in MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1977, No. 9.

5. In contemporary world usage the term "technology" takes in licenses, patents, technical documents, models of new machines, trademarks, production and technical expertise, consulting and managerial services and the professional training of personnel for foreign states.
6. "Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade, December 1981," Wash., 1982.
7. *Ibid.*, 9 September 1982.
8. *CHEMICAL AGE*, 25 April 1980, pp 942-950.
9. *TIME*, 12 July 1982, p 27.
10. *THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN*, 25 July 1977, p 129.
11. *SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS*, August 1982, p 19.
12. See, for example, N. Volkov, "Technological Dependence and the Ways of Overcoming It," *AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA*, 1982, No 6.
13. For more about the consequences of technology transfer, see V. Shitov, "Liberated Countries and New Technology," *AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA*, 1981, No 8.
14. "Scientific Cooperation for Development. Search for New Directions," ed. by P. Lavitare, A. Parthasarathi and B. Udgaonkar, New Delhi, 1980, p 55.
15. UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/779, 27 February 1980, p 2; "Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade, December 1981"; *SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS*, August 1982, p 19.
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# 'PROJECT DEMOCRACY,' ITS GOALS AND MOTIVES

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[Article by I. Ye. Malashenko]

[Text] A foreign policy propaganda program, reflecting the development of the Reagan Administration's ideological views during its 2 years in power, has been submitted to the U.S. Congress--"Project Democracy."

As soon as the Republicans entered the White House, the new leaders tried to reorder the priorities of the Democratic policy of "defending human rights." This policy had evoked a negative response from rightwing conservatives, who saw it as a threat to the "friendly" dictatorships that sometimes became the targets of "human rights defense" criticism.

At first Washington tried to substitute a propaganda initiative of its own for Carter's policy of "human rights defense." It launched a propaganda campaign about the Soviet Union's alleged "involvement" in "international terrorism," and this became something like the new administration's calling card. In fact, the "struggle against international terrorism" served as only one aspect of a broad-scale campaign against the mythical "Soviet threat," a campaign which turned into the main element of the Republican administration's foreign political and ideological offensive.

The Reagan Administration obviously did not, however, consider the fact that some criticism of the dictatorships was supported by liberal circles in the United States and abroad. After encountering widespread opposition to its efforts to scrap the "human rights defense" policy, the White House tried to adapt the latter to its own ideological aims with the aid of the distinction made by U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig in spring 1981 between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes. The then secretary of state used the first term to define the socialist states and the term "authoritarian" to define anti-communist dictatorships, which supposedly had the potential to become "more democratic." Haig openly advised that the practices of "authoritarian" regimes not be criticized and that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries be made the exclusive target of this "criticism."

Washington's attempt to rebuild the "human rights defense" policy on the basis of the abovementioned distinction between states with differing social orders

failed. As a result, the administration had to modify its goals to some degree and to modify its tactics in the area of human rights policy.

The new ideological offensive was announced by Ronald Reagan in his speech in the British Parliament on 8 June 1981, at which time he called upon the West European allies to join the "crusade for freedom and democracy." He declared that the United States had begun work on a specific project as the American contribution to this "global campaign." He was referring to "Project Democracy."

The programs included in "Project Democracy," which was submitted to the Congress on 21 February 1981, differ widely in terms of scope and nature and are united only by their anticommunist purpose. In all, the project has five interrelated aims.

The first is to teach foreign politicians the "theory and practice of democracy." In other words, it is an attempt to implant the basic principles of the American political system in the political elite of other countries, especially the developing states. This is the purpose, for example, of the program for the organization of symposiums on "the nature of democratic societies" for military leaders, who traditionally occupy civilian positions in the developing countries (the cost of this program is 1.7 million dollars). It is assumed that the military rulers of Honduras or Guatemala would have no trouble giving their dictatorial regimes a democratic appearance after undergoing this kind of training.

The second is an attempt to popularize the American system with the aid of commercial influence in the educational system in foreign countries--by erecting centers of American Area studies, improving education in the English language, offering up scholarships, etc. Young people will be the main target of Washington's propaganda. It is for these young people that courses in American history will be taught in foreign universities (at a cost of \$30,000 million), that 600,000 hours of instruction will be improved in the African countries at a cost of 1.8 million dollars, and American studies centers will be organized in about twenty (10.6 million dollars).

The third aim of the project is "to strengthen the basic democratic institutions" of Latin American countries. In other words, this will essentially mean the support and direct financing of trade unions, political parties and mass media acting in Washington's interests.

Fourthly, Washington hopes to popularize the American way of life by means of radio, television, and books, the distribution of books and magazines, school programs, in universities and other institutions and the mass media." The participation of a new magazine, COMMUNICATIONS IMPACT, in English, French and Spanish will have the purpose "free communication" (\$30,000 dollars), the distribution of 100,000 copies of a Yellow Book to popularize "American political institutions" (1.2 million), the expansion of AFL-CIO propaganda programs (4.8 million) and other programs will serve this purpose.

Fifthly, the "development of contacts between American citizens and organizers (and their official counterparts)" has been planned to create "international

support of the principles lying at the basis of the project. The program for one year of labor union experience (1 million dollars), exchange visits by American and foreign union dignitaries (150,000) and others fall into this category.

Even so in the past, these measures will provide American special services with a ready field of action for the infiltration of neo-political organizations and movements.

The administration's official spokesmen are not concealing the fact that the new project includes programs carried out earlier in the form of covert CIA operations, particularly in operations calculated to destabilize governments unfriendly to Washington. A special organization is to continue employing these methods to cultivate what is loosely called democracy in Central and South America (11.2 million dollars). The allocation of 8.5 million dollars for the realization of "democratic trade unions in key regions and countries" through WFO-CIT channels has been planned.

As Secretary of State N. Shultz announced, "most of the programs are intended for Latin America, Africa and Asia." This is certainly no coincidence; it reflects the serious leadership's worries about the extreme unpopularity of the Reagan States and its policy in the developing countries and the growing lack of agreement with "American democracy" in all countries.

The actual program of the programs intended for the developing countries is clearly indicated by the actions that have already been taken in this area. As WATSON correspondent H. Hirschman wrote, "even before the start of 'Project Democracy,' the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was giving money to some people who are obviously at odds with this concept." In fiscal year 1982/83, for example, the so-called Committee for Central America was allocated over 162,000 dollars to pay for visits to the United States by official representatives ("democratic leaders") of repressive Latin American regimes. The American taxpayer financed trips to Washington by a representative of the Pinochet regime, an emissary from the Haitian dictatorship and another dozen "democrats" of this kind. The Center for Free Enterprise Education and Research received almost 50,000 dollars to hold a seminar for 25 Guatemalans.

Official spokesmen have taken every opportunity to stress that only negligible portions of these programs will concern Western Europe and that, in the words of Assistant Secretary of State L. Eagleburger, they will consist in "a sincere attempt to reveal 'the common values of Americans and West Europeans.'" What does this really mean? Although the sums earmarked for propaganda in the West European countries are far smaller than the allocations intended for developing countries, they are expected to play an important role in undermining the West European antiwar movement. It has long been one of the primary goals of U.S. foreign policy propaganda to discredit and split this movement.

For example, 195,000 dollars will be allocated to the "Independent" Center for the Study of Labor and Social Policy, headed by E. Lefevre. The money is supposed to be used to popularize the Reagan Administration's position on nuclear weapons in Europe and to misinform the West European public.





The slogan of "human rights defense" has an important strategic advantage. It is capable of evoking broader support than any other ideological instrument.

It is unfortunate that Carter's campaign "in defense of human rights" was not fully supported by liberals and conservatives. But whereas the liberals supported this program because they regarded it as a sign of liberalism and as an alternative to the moral and unprincipled foreign policy of aiding discredited governments, the conservatives saw it primarily as a means of strengthening the language of anticommunism.

One reason of the partial campaign was the reason for its ineffectiveness, and within the context of the "alignment" of internal political forces, liberals and conservatives had different hopes for it. Understandably, the campaign began to be criticized from various standpoints.

The Reagan Administration's desire to link "Project Democracy" with the slogan of "human rights defense" testifies to an attempt to reinforce the particular ideological platform that conforms to the conservative aims of strengthening leadership and to simultaneously reduce the criticism of the administration's unbridled ideological policy. It is for this purpose that the policy of "human rights defense" is being revived in a new form. The slogan has remained unchanged, and this must appeal at least to some of the liberal supporters, but the definite changes in the content of the policy are even more important to them.

As for following conservatives in the United States, they should be pleased that the primary ideological purpose of the programs making up "Project Democracy" have American observers have drawn a direct connection between the development of this project and Ronald Reagan's attempts to "pacify" the conservative critics on the extreme right who constantly demand the "reorientation" of American foreign policy in the direction of more pronounced anticommunism and anti-socialism.

The success of Reagan's extensive domestic political support for "Project Democracy" is also attested to by the persistence with which administration spokesmen have stressed, on the one hand, its "bipartisan character" and, on the other, its "broad" nature as a project involving private organizations as well as federal agencies. Although most of the programs in the project were made by the CIA, the State Department and the Agency for International Development, representatives of the Republican and Democratic party congress committees and of the Bipartisan American Political Fund and "Project Democracy" Task Force both parties took part in planning the project.

The Reagan Administration is making energetic efforts to broaden the framework of "Project Democracy" in order to maximize the base of its "campaign for democracy" and, if possible, to disguise its true purpose. During the initial stages of planning, however, only conservative "think tanks," like the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, were working on the project. These organizations have long advised the maximum intensification of the ideological struggle on the global level and the much more vigorous application of American foreign policy principles.

A comprehensive program for the reconstruction of U.S. ideological concepts was laid forth around a year and a half ago, for example, by American Enterprise Institute researcher G. Lemonski, who was appointed the National Security Council's acting adviser on Soviet and East European affairs in February 1951. He was appointed to the NSC staff after the departure of W. F. Flinn, who summed up the administration's approach to the Soviet Union in a statement offering the USSR a choice between the "rejection of the communist system" or World War III. This is how the NSC staff acquired this "more formidable," 45-year-old conservative, although his views are amazingly similar to those of his predecessor.

G. Lemonski, who sees some kind of "ideological threat" as the "chief danger" of the Soviet Union, has recommended an emphasis on the "global struggle of ideas." For this purpose, he advises the use of "all non-military weapons: international radio broadcasts, American libraries abroad, international contacts in education, culture and tourism, the distribution of books, brochures, films and television programs; the augmentation of the number of foreign news correspondents and the employment of more foreigners (journalists, for example) in American news agencies abroad, and the more active use of international bodies like the United Nations for an ideological offensive."

At the beginning of June, Reagan decided to appoint as his adviser on Soviet affairs W. F. Flinn, who had worked in the U.S. embassy in Moscow for 7 years (most recently as a temporary charge d'affaires) and was then the ambassador to Luxembourg.

The NSC is now expected to play a special role in the coordination of American official policy propaganda efforts and it will now have direct jurisdiction over the entire propaganda machine. In January 1951 Presidential Directive 77 provided for the creation of a new committee, a so-called special planning group which will take charge of all forms of American "public diplomacy" (the term used to define foreign policy propaganda). The chairman of the group is the president's assistant for national security affairs and the other members are the secretary of state, secretary of defense, NSIA director, AID director and the President's assistant for communications.

The NSC has jurisdiction over four interdepartmental committees responsible for coordinating various sectors of "public diplomacy": the International Information Committee, under the supervision of the NSIA; the Committee on International Policy, in which the key role is played by the State Department; the Committee on International Broadcasting, controlled directly by the NSC; the Committee for Public Relations, co-chaired by the President's deputy secretary for national security affairs and his assistant for communications.

The work on "Project Democracy" will be overseen by the Committee on International Policy, in which Assistant Secretary of State L. Eagleburger has been appointed chairman. The work on the project will be a kind of translation of the NSC's foreign policy program. It was W. F. Flinn who recently declared that the "struggle for democracy" was the "fundamental aspect" of American foreign policy over the long term. W. F. Flinn said that the administration expects the work on the project to be completed within the next 20 years.

The financial aspects of these plans have been made the responsibility of the USIA, which has considerable experience in the organization of anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaigns. The funds needed for the attainment of the administration's ambitious aims will be deposited in the USIA budget, the amounts will be substantial: The administration plans to spend 20 million dollars on the project just during the current fiscal year, and 65 million more next year. And this, as Washington officials have pointed out, is only the beginning.

The USIA will then distribute these funds to other agencies and organizations, including the State Department, the Agency for International Development and others. In this way, a single fund will be created for the financing of all project programs; according to reports in the American press, this system was borrowed from West Germany, which has a central fund for the financing of all West German political parties.

The success of "Project Democracy" will depend largely, however, on the Congress, which must authorize the necessary allocations. The administration's new initiative has not aroused any great enthusiasm on Capitol Hill. Secretary of State H. Shultz was "cross-examined" by Democratic congressmen who wished to know how the United States planned to "promote democracy" in countries ruled by dictatorial regimes friendly to the United States.

Not even all of the legislators heeded Shultz' call to "fearlessly bear this cross." Congressman J. Pritchard said: "The more we learn about this matter, the more it worries me." "Judging by all indications, this is simply a multi-million dollar propaganda campaign," Congressman P. Kostmayer agreed. Disgusted by the legislators' reaction, the organizers of the project hypocritically denied its propagandistic nature. Director C. Wick of the USIA told the Congress that "Project Democracy" was "not at all intended to be a 'propaganda campaign'"; he accused the press of fostering "mistaken ideas."

Thus Shultz, however, is hardly likely to mislead anyone. The administration's propaganda activity has already encountered public resistance more than once, and has sometimes even been opposed by the legislators.

For this reason, the possible scales on which the Reagan Administration will be able to launch "Project Democracy" are still unknown.

There is no question, however, that Washington's attempts to organize a "global ideological offensive" according to "updated" anticommunist recipes will not win the Reagan Administration any victories in its struggle against foreign but not internal progress. "I do not think that this program will give us anything but trouble," Congress P. Kostmayer acknowledged, for example, during the discussion of "Project Democracy." Washington's new propaganda initiative, which is based on a refusal to take the realities of today's world into account, can result only in a waste of the American taxpayer's money and the further decline of Washington's prestige in the eyes of the world public.

REF ID: A66137; Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1981

## PENTAGON EFFORTS TO ATTAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed by PRAVDA 17 Jan 83) pp 61-68

Article by V. A. Mazing and S. K. Oznobishchev

(0041) The first half of 1983 was marked by the dramatic intensification of the anti-Soviet militarist campaign in the United States, which was headed by the President himself. The head of the Pentagon and other members of the U.S. political and military leadership have taken a more than active part in this campaign.

The campaign is supposed to validate, as Yu. V. Andropov said in his replies to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent on 27 March 1983, the United States' unimpaired ambitions to become the dominant military power in the world. To this end, the administration has resorted to inexcusable distortions of Soviet reality and the most unscrupulous tricks.

In June the Pentagon published a new "research work"--"Soviet Military Strength, 1983," with a foreword by C. Weinberger. The authors of this "research" are primarily trying to convince the reader of the "need" for a considerable U.S. rearmament program in response to the "rapidly growing Soviet military threat." The first version of this "research," which was published in 1981, was subjected to quite serious criticism, even by Western experts, for the tendentious presentation of material and the tendency to ignore comparative data on the most important categories of weapons possessed by the USSR and United States and by the Warsaw Pact and NATO states.

The new Pentagon publication contains several tables which, according to its authors, are in "objective reflection" of the balance of armed forces and weapons between the sides today. But the numerical data presented in this "research," just as in other publications of this type, suffer from a biased approach and do not take into account all of the factors determining the actual state of affairs. The authors of this latest "research" provide a tendentious description of the organization of the Soviet armed forces, juggle the facts about the balance of forces and use fraudulent methods to assess the military expenditures of the sides. When they describe the "frightening Soviet military preparations" with the aid of color illustrations and all types of tables and diagrams, the authors compare only the most convenient indicators of

The staff and the press would distort and distort the total picture of the balance of power and Soviet R & D weapons and troops. Numerous statements of troops and weapons deliberately ignore the fact that the USSR is exposed by all NATO countries and not just the United States.

The staff fails to depict the existing military-strategic parity between the USSR and United States as some kind of Western "lag" on the global and regional levels. The measures taken by the Soviet Union since fall 1981 (when the first Pentagon "research work" on this subject was published) to strengthen its defense capabilities are depicted as the latest round "in the continuous arms race. The Soviet Union has been escalating for 21 years." In their discussion of Soviet military construction, the authors confuse cause and effect and try to obscure the fact that the arms race is rooted in American soil and that virtually all new themes of this race have been initiated by the United States.

The Pentagon staff deliberately says nothing about the steps and measures the USSR took during this year and a half to curb the arms race, reduce military confrontation and facilitate the conclusion of agreements during meeting talks. The main premises of Soviet military doctrine and foreign policy are presented in a distorted light.

This subject, for my the least, Pentagon publication was analyzed in detail in the Soviet press. The publication, as Senator E. Kennedy pointed out, "coincided with the year in the military budget and the discussion of the nuclear forces reduction." He called the study "a classic example of scare-mongering."

It could also accurately have been called a set of deliberate misinterpretations and lies, which also fill the annual report of the U.S. secretary of defense on the military budget for fiscal year 1984 and military programs for fiscal years 1984-88. In the very first pages of this report, the Pentagon staff puts forth the thesis that runs all through the report: "The Soviet Union poses the greatest military threat to the United States and its interests and will continue to pose this threat in the near future." This "threat" covers literally on all levels and in all areas of military confrontation.

In 1983, assessing the situation with regard to strategic arms, Weinberger writes that "the Soviet Union's achievement of a certain degree of invulnerability for its ICBM's has made it impossible for the United States to deliver an effective strike against Soviet ground-based nuclear weapons." The program for the production and deployment of new ICBM's should, in the opinion of the Pentagon staff, change this "unfavorable" situation, and he requests additional allocations of 1.768 billion dollars for the development and creation of MX strategic submarines for this purpose were 1.911 billion in fiscal year 1982 and 1.7 billion in 1983). Research projects to study methods of basing American ICBM's in underground sites will also be continued in fiscal year 1984.

In development of the third component of the U.S. strategic "triad" presupposes the completion of several programs to heighten the "survivability" of the American nuclear submarine fleet. The program for the construction of new nuclear submarines is being stepped up. The first ship of this series, the

... "combat ship" of the 500-ton class, which was ordered in 1981. A second ship of this type, the USS Zumwalt, was also ordered in 1981. The third, fourth and fifth ships of this type are scheduled for delivery in 1985, 1986 and 1987. Now that the Pentagon has decided to build 10 Trident missile submarines for no later than this year, the Navy's 1986 shipbuilding program also includes the delivery for the submarine fleet of 10 SSBNs for the 700-ton class (the delivery of 10 SSBNs was scheduled in 1985), which will be the first ship of a new series equipped with 12 missiles, the production of which is to begin this year. The Navy can be expected before 1990. The budget for fiscal year 1986 also provides for the purchase of the first 10 Trident missiles. The Navy plans for the purchase of 10 Trident I missiles to be replaced by 10 Trident II missiles, and this also reflects the Pentagon's intention to start the development of submarines equipped with Trident II missiles.

The Navy's 1986 shipbuilding program with regard to the construction of submarines and surface ships of the 500-ton class is a special case. A battleship of the 40,000-ton class, the "New Jersey," was already in service with 100mm anti-aircraft missiles. These ships will be replaced by the requirements of "naval readiness," the equipping of submarines with missiles of this type and delivery intended for the destruction of Soviet submarines postponed for about a year.

The Navy's 1986 shipbuilding program has already been included in strategic matters. In 1985, 100 B-26 planes will be equipped with them. The equipping of the strategic B-70 bombers with cruise missiles is scheduled for 1987.

The 1986 shipbuilding program for fiscal year 1986 includes the construction and procurement of all components of U.S. Strategic Forces. The Navy's 1986 shipbuilding program has adopted the previously rejected program for the B-1 bomber. According to Pentagon plans, the American Air Force will start receiving missiles of the new plane carrying cruise missiles, the B-1B, in 1985. The 1986 shipbuilding program called for the construction of 100 B-26 planes, and the program, with a total cost of 10.5 billion dollars, would be completed in 1988. The Navy's 1986 shipbuilding program will be carried out under the heading of "Strategic Forces." According to Pentagon plans, it will be carried out under the heading of "Strategic Forces." The new program will include the construction of 100 B-26 planes, and the program, with a total cost of 10.5 billion dollars, would be completed in 1988. The Navy's 1986 shipbuilding program will be carried out under the heading of "Strategic Forces." According to Pentagon plans, it will be carried out under the heading of "Strategic Forces." The new program will include the construction of 100 B-26 planes, and the program, with a total cost of 10.5 billion dollars, would be completed in 1988.

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... "The Road to Strategic Deterrence." It is supposed to provide U.S. military and political leaders with a comprehensive supply of air and space intelligence data in peacetime and in the event of a crisis. Intensive work is being conducted to improve the radar detection and air warning network, and the construction of new command centers and communication links has begun.

The United States has not given up its plans to create an effective, technologically advanced ABM system. Although the Secretary of defense is quick to emphasize on one of this program that it is not contrary to the articles and provisions of the Soviet-American ABM treaty of 1972, this is not true. According to Pentagon calculations, the ABM system being created in the United States should be able to intercept targets in space and in dense atmospheric strata. The latest Western systems will be used for this purpose, including one and a half warheads that are prohibited by the ABM treaty and are completely inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the international treaty of 1967 on the principles of activities by states in the exploration and use of outer space, which was signed by around 100 governments, including the United States. What is more, as Yu. V. Andropov said in his replies to DER SPIEGEL magazine, the intention and danger of Washington's declared plans to develop formidable and highly effective antimissile defense consist in the expectation of instantly, the assumption that a first nuclear strike can be delivered in retaliation against retaliation. The temptation to push the button--that is, to put the world on the verge of the nuclear abyss--is only a short step away.

In the area of so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons, or theater nuclear weapons, the redeployment of American nuclear forces in Western Europe will be the work of several of the next 5 years. Specifically, this means work on the ABM-70 only and the December 11970 NATO decision on the deployment of one medium-range American nuclear missiles and the expansion of arsenals of nuclear artillery, tactical missiles, bombs and naval systems on the European continent. Weinberger's report says that the Pentagon has already placed orders for the Pershing II medium-range missiles in triple the amount envisaged in the deployment in Western Europe. It is no secret that the plan for the "modernization" of NATO nuclear forces envisages the deployment of 100 Pershing II missiles and 464 GM's<sup>4</sup> with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers.

The United States has destroyed 155mm and 203mm artillery weapons and Lance anti-aircraft missiles within the European theater. In the next 5 years the United States plans to improve the capabilities of this category of weapons. The production of W70-3 neutron warheads for Lance missiles and W70 warheads for 203mm howitzers is to be completed. Although these warheads are now stored on American territory (this is underscored in Weinberger's report), the absolute majority of experts admit that they are intended for use outside the United States, primarily in Europe. Washington's plans and efforts to build up American nuclear weapons in the European theater of combat are supposed to tip the continental balance of power in its favor and to lay a material and technical foundation for "limited nuclear war" in a region located thousands of kilometers away from American territory.

This is also the purpose of the planned redeployment of three American brigades (a total of around 15,000 servicemen) in direct proximity to the borders of the

the 1980s. An agreement on the technical and "administrative" aspects of the program was reached at American-West German talks in March 1983, but a decision was not reached on the financing of this program, which has an estimated cost of 1 billion dollars. The talks will be continued this year and Bonn will be prepared to assume part of the cost of transferring American troops to Eastern regions of the FRG.

The United States is also taking part in the program for the enlargement of the NATO infrastructure. Its share of the cost is 27 percent (400 million dollars in the fiscal year 1984); what is more, 35-40 percent of the annual allocations will be used for the maintenance and support of U.S. armed forces under NATO jurisdiction. These projects include the maintenance of military bases and missile sites and the construction and protection of communications and fuel depots. Washington wants countries where American troops are stationed to participate more in their material and logistical support. The Pentagon has reported that definite agreements have been reached with the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Great Britain. According to the Pentagon chief, the American-West German agreement signed last year is particularly significant. The FRG Government agreed to create reserve brigades (with about 93,000 people), which will be responsible for the organizational support of American units stationed in West Germany or transferred there in the event of a crisis or war.

One of the problems connected with the presence of American troops in Western Europe is the question of financing. When the budget for fiscal year 1983 was being discussed, some congressmen, without questioning the "need" for the American military presence in Western Europe, suggested that the recall of American troops from Europe to the American continent might be economically

advantageous. As reported, the Pentagon analyzed this matter in detail and rejected several alternative plans for the possible recall of certain units of American troops from Western Europe. The general conclusion was that it would cost more in 1984-85 to station these troops on American territory than it would to maintain them in Europe for rapid transfer to the European continent in the event of an "emergency" than to continue financing their presence in Europe. "This analysis," the Pentagon chief categorically stated, "brings an end to all of the speculation that we could maintain the necessary level of security or fulfill our NATO obligations at a lower cost by withdrawing our advance forces from Europe. On the contrary, from the European standpoint, forward basing is the best way of fulfilling our commitments to the maintenance of collective security."

It is worth mentioning "forward basing" in new zones other than Western Europe, now devoted to be "spheres of U.S. vital interests." "As a country of global interests and interests throughout the world, the United States must maintain a strong system of forward defense," Weinberger declared. This means the presence of American ground and naval forces in Japan, South Korea and elsewhere in the U.S. military bases abroad and the presence of carrier task forces in the Western Pacific, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The number of American troops abroad increased 54,000 last year.

The Pentagon is working at full speed on the program for the development of air and naval transport forces. The aim is to considerably heighten the possibilities of the rapid transfer of additional contingents of U.S. armed forces to any of the "hot spots" in the world. For example, the construction of 15 new amphibious ships for the simultaneous conduct of two large-scale landing operations in different parts of the world has been planned for fiscal years 1984-86. Allocations have been requested for the production of 50 additional C-17 transport planes and 44 KC-10 transport tanker aircraft. Research projects will be continued in fiscal year 1984 to develop a new model of the wide-body C-17 cargo plane, capable of takeoffs and landings on virtually any airfield.

The massive stockpiling of weapons, ammunition and materiel for U.S. combat units transferred from overseas is being conducted in various parts of the world that represent, according to the American command, "future theaters of war." For example, weapons for three Army divisions and ammunition for main-combat units on active duty on the American continent were deployed in Western Europe in the 1960's. The storage of equipment and ammunition for a fourth division is now being completed, and weapons for the fifth and sixth U.S. Army divisions are to be stockpiled in Belgium and the Netherlands in fiscal year 1985. Ammunition and auxiliary equipment depots for the American Air Force are being set up in Western Europe, Southwest Asia and South Korea, depots for Marine brigades are being set up in Norway, etc.

The United States has been able to gain the consent of a group of developing nations to the use of their local airfields and ports, military facilities and installations, navigation stations and radar equipment by American troops, and to call the "rapid deployment force." Almost a billion dollars has been allocated for the enlargement and modernization of U.S. strong points and military bases in Egypt, Oman, Kenya, Somalia, the Azores and the island of Diego Garcia.

The U.S. attempts to intensify its global expansionism by raising the level of its military presence abroad, building new overseas bases and military installations and remodeling existing ones and carrying out programs to heighten the combat capabilities of American armed forces are consistent with the plans of the U.S. military-political leadership to establish its domination over those countries and regions and to create bridgeheads for the start of military conflicts thousands of kilometers away from American territory and in direct proximity to the boundaries of the Soviet Union. The quantity and duration of military conflicts have been made dependent on the "ability to resolve peace on terms acceptable to the United States." The U.S. Armed Forces "must be able to win a conflict in one or several theaters of war" and "be prepared for protracted combat," Weinberger said. In essence, the report set forth the concept of "protracted nuclear war," the basic premises of which were listed in the "defense directives for fiscal years 1984-88."

When American strategists speak of "protracted" war, they mean any armed conflict lasting longer than a single exchange of nuclear strikes. They proceed from the false and extremely dangerous assumption that this kind of conflict can be fought and won. The absurdity of this line of reasoning is obvious.



For more details, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No. 12, pp. 65-68--Editor's note.

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## AMERICAN CRITICISM OF REAGAN POLICY IN AFRICA SURVEYED

Source: *SOVIET SVOBODA*, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA IN RUSSIAN No. 7, 1983 (1983) (10 pages) LC 83-93379

Article by V. A. Mityayev: "Reagan's African Policy: Criticism of the 'New' Approach"

(Soviet) The change in the Reagan Administration's political tactics in relations with the countries of black Africa and the reordering of priorities in the approach to urgent problems pertaining to Africa in general have aroused the attention of American experts on African affairs. The authors of recently published works have tried to determine the purpose of Washington's so-called "new African policy" and its possible effect on U.S. national interests--which they perceived differently by different groups of authors.

The apologists for the current administration's foreign policy activities feel that the approach is new primarily because it reflects the regionalist view of African problems that was characteristic of the Carter Administration and that the cause of the assignment of higher priority to Africa in general and the more diversified development of contacts with the independent states of Tropical Africa. The Republicans subjected this approach to considerable criticism.

Many American researchers have commented on the anti-Soviet aims of the Reagan Administration's African policy, calling it the focal point of all African policy. These aims stem from the globalist concepts that have traditionally influenced the Republican Party, with a superimposed subjective factor in the form of the extremely reactionary views and pathological misconception of the current President and the political forces behind him.

In an article entitled "On Safari Again," part of a series of articles in 1981S magazine on Africa, H. Kitchen, a well-known expert on African affairs, wrote that "the Reagan Administration is more likely than its predecessor to categorically look at Africa with U.S. national interests," and the "articulation of U.S. national interests in Africa puts more emphasis on anti-Sovietism than on the idea of helping Africa for the foundations for economic and political independence."

The overall criticism of the Reagan Administration's economic policy in Africa has been interpreted in recent work, by American authors as a sign of



... (over administration) of a general tendency to regard the African continent as an arena of struggle against the USSR. The volume of American capital investments and trade with the African countries is relatively small, and their role in the overall structure of U.S.-African ties transcends the limits of merely numerical indicators. This is particularly true of direct aid to the African countries, which is offered directly and through international financial organizations.

Analyzing the economic aspects of U.S. policy in Africa, Carol Lancaster, who succeeded Assistant Secretary of State C. Crocker as the director of the African studies program at Georgetown University, defined its main elements in her article "U.S. Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa": an emphasis on activity by the military system to the detriment of government programs, reflected in changes in proportional budget allocations for so-called development aid and, correspondingly, in larger allocations for the financing of African imports; the concentration of American "aid" in such American strongholds on the continent as Nigeria, Mauritania, Kenya, Zaïre and Liberia and a corresponding reduction in aid to states with a less stable political situation; the continued financing of such pro-American governments, such as Mali, Upper Volta, Gambia, Lesotho, Togo, and Senegal, with an underlying political motive--the desire of neutralizing Soviet influence in this region.<sup>2</sup>

Since the relations that exist with South Africa are a key aspect of Washington's general African strategy. The interest of American ruling circles in supporting the Pretoria regime as a bastion of capitalism and anticommunism on the continent and in the use of this regime for the further consolidation of American economic positions is understandably in conflict with the more general interest in maintaining America's prestige in Africa and in inhibiting the growth of the Soviet influence on the continent.

On May 19, 1982, the former Chairman and current member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, who has always spoken out vehemently against apartheid and against American contacts with South Africa, declared in an article published last year "the Reagan Administration's approach to the strategic, economic, and political problems the United States is encountering in Africa... is that there will have been a shortage of the necessary diplomatic concern. The chief weakness of this approach is a South African policy that is contrary to the interests and the ideals of the United States."

Should also draw other defects to Washington's general strategy in Africa. For example, the as yet unsuccessful attempts to repeal the "Clark Amendment," which would allow the United States to openly support UNICED in Angola; the reduced allocations for the development of cultural exchange and the emphasis on contacts by the private sector in the sphere of economic relations. However, Kilgore says in summation, "no matter what kind of other delicate African policy (the policy of the Reagan Administration--V. M.) might prove it is, it is the moral and strategic bankruptcy of the American approach to the Republic of South Africa that would have the most negative long-range effect on our country."<sup>3</sup>

and a responsibility of this agency. I have never been completely satisfied with the official representative way of U.S. calling attention, and have been with the publicity in the works of American embassy in Soviet affairs. It was not only the American ambassadorship was also accompanied by a number of several articles criticizing the attempts to use it to influence the Soviet Union after World War II, but the reason that this argument was not with the American embassy of the United States. In fact, the U.S. has been and still is following in this regard. Out of this way is "Mineral Policy" article, "Mineral Mirror."

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and the idea of "economic apartheid" was suggested by Dr. Robert Mugabe, who was then a member of the Rhodesian cabinet. A defense and later became the president of the ZANU, and through his leadership at the end of last year. He frankly warned the anti-apartheid coalition that, "in the absence of positive change, by 1985 the likelihood of South Africa could be as great a threat to peace as the situation in the Middle East by today." McNamara advised the western governments to cut off the diamonds, manganese, vanadium and platinum and draw up "emergency laws" to force South Africa should stop exporting these minerals. This would force South Africa that the "nuclear weapon" does not work. The "McNamara Plan" was supported by New York Times correspondent J. Lewis, who saw it as "a serious challenge to South Africa against January."

Following the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, J. Patrick at the January 1981 conference of the Afro-American Institute in New York, however, the Reagan administration does not intend to change its policy. He responded to the criticism of Washington's "isolation" policy with the cynical remark that "we have never asked any African government to provide its support for the linkage doctrine. It makes no difference to us whether it is approved or disapproved."

The conference, which was attended by almost 200 prominent Africans and U.S. officials, was held at the Lincoln Center, according to the WASHINGTON POST, a "forum for the expression of the Reagan administration's policy of 'constructive engagement' in southern Africa under white rule." Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe called the "constructive" policy "blackmail"; President Sam Nujoma of Namibia described it as "cynical, disrespectful and inhumane, because it gives white Afrikaners a right to remain in Namibia." W. W. Williams, the Democratic Party member of Congress who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and who attended the conference, acknowledged that African leaders are more disillusioned with U.S. policy than a year ago. He said that the U.S. has taken no support of South Africa, which has led to a "cold war" because "we are that it can do whatever it wants in this region without fear of reprisal from the United States."

The conference also discussed the "new" U.S. approach to Africa and the role of the United States in this region. The conference was held in New York City.

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## TRUMP MODERATOR ON CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PROBLEMS REVIEWED

MYATSE SARAT, *ZEKHNIMIA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed by press 11 Jul 83) pp 104-114

[Reviewed by O. Ye. Saratov of book "Soyedinennyye Shtaty Ameriki" [United States of America], Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Moscow, 1982. "America's Problems at the End of the 20th Century"]

[Note: A collective monograph, "Soyedinennyye Shtaty Ameriki," written by a group of authors from the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the supervision of A. V. Anikin, M. N. Voznyuk and A. I. Shapiro, was published at the end of 1982.<sup>1</sup> It is part of the series "Present-Day Monopoly Capitalism." It is an examination of the United States' major problems of the 1970's and early 1980's and the latest developments in the economic, social and political life of this country. Many of the authors have been studying U.S. economics and politics for more than three decades and are recognized experts on American affairs, and this has contributed a great deal to the highly skilled investigation of the majority of these problems. Ten years separate this work from the previous institute monograph on the same subject,<sup>2</sup> and the two books combined can give readers an overview of developments in the United States during most of the postwar period.]

The 1970's and early 1980's were a turning point in the development of American capitalism. During this relatively short period of time there were three malfunctions of the U.S. economy (1969-1970, 1973-1975, 1980-1982), accompanied by the loss of considerable productive resources and a rise in unemployment unprecedented in the postwar period. The fundamental conclusions drawn by the CPSU and other fraternal parties with regard to the severe crisis of the system of state-monopoly economic regulation were wholly corroborated. Massive structural disparities in the development of the American economy became evident during this period. The rate of economic growth slowed down dramatically. This was accompanied by the decline of the basic indicators of the effectiveness of capitalist economic management--the dynamics of labor productivity, return on capital and profit margins. The serious effects of the U.S. tendency to lag behind the other centers of imperialist rivalry, Western Europe and Japan, in the international economic and political positions of American capital became fully evident.

The second and third chapters of the book are devoted to the analysis of the role of the state in the development of the economy. The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of the state in the development of the economy. The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of the state in the development of the economy. The third chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of the state in the development of the economy.

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The twenty-first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of the state in the development of the economy. The twenty-second chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of the state in the development of the economy. The twenty-third chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of the state in the development of the economy.

...and it is this which is the key to the whole. All of this helped the authors write a valuable book, destined to appeal to even the most demanding reader.

...This does not mean that all sections and chapters of the monograph are of equal value and that all of the statements made by the authors are equally valid and indisputable. This kind of book probably does not even exist. The deficiencies of this monograph include, in particular, the inadequate analysis of such topics as financial capital and the financial oligarchy, the extreme underloading of fixed capital and the role of the annual conference of the "Big Seven," led by the United States, for the planning of economic and political strategy in the capitalist world. The scientific value of the study, however, is measured not by what it lacks, but primarily by what it adds to the knowledge we have gained from earlier works and by the progress of thought in a particular field of knowledge. From this standpoint, this collected institutional work deserves a high evaluation: it contains thorough and correct analysis of the economic, social structure, class struggle and domestic and foreign policies, provides a better understanding of the reversals and the role of the dominant administration's strategy and gives researchers much food for thought by inviting them to consider new questions. We feel that the following are some of the most intriguing of these questions.

1. What basis in the assumption of power by the Republican Party conservative administration headed by Ronald Reagan, is regarded as the beginning of a "new era" in the history of American capitalism? Can "neoclassicism" solve the problems in the American economy, which could not be solved by the system of state-monopoly capitalism based on neo-Kennedyan recipes, over the medium or long term? Will this tendency to lag behind other centers of imperialist rivalry cause America to lose its leading position in the capitalist world by the end of this century or the beginning of the next?

2. Will it be possible to answer these questions with the aid of the analysis conducted in the chapters of this book and research currently being conducted in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

...The Republican Party, headed by Ronald Reagan, won a victory in the 1980 presidential election, many observers in the United States and abroad pointed out the swift, long duration and stability of this political reversal. This conclusion was prompted to a considerable extent by the Republicans themselves, members of Congress, administration spokesmen and their supporters in the mass media. But over 2 years later, the situation changed perceptibly. The number of persons pointing out the temporary, superficial nature of this reversal is growing by the day and even by the hour. Is this a coincidence?

In conclusion, we can see that the results of the 1980 election proved that there was and is no solid basis for Republican statements about the extensive support they allegedly received from the majority of the American public.<sup>3</sup> Presidents in the United States are usually elected not by a majority, but by a plurality. From one-fourth to one-third of all voters. Ronald Reagan is no exception to this rule. Table 1 shows that he was elected by 28.6 percent of the voters.

Table 1

## Postwar Presidential Election Results

Year	Registered voters, millions	Number of persons who voted, millions	% of voters who voted	% of votes won by President
1948	97.4	48.7	49.6	26.3
1952	98.2	61.6	55.4	35.1
1956	99.2	61.8	57.8	34.6
1960	102.1	68.5	60.1	32.8
1964	128.1	70.8	61.3	37.9
1968	120.7	73.1	43.4	26.3
1972	130.1	77.1	42.0	35.4
1976	130.7	81.3	50.6	37.3
1980	166.0	86.5	50.0	26.6

U.S. Census Bureau, *The Gallup Opinion Index*, December 1976; *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, 1 November 1980; "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981," p. 175.

The victory of the Republican Party, which had been the opposition party for most of the 20th century, was due to a specific set of circumstances. The most important was the profound disillusionment of various strata of American society--from the grand bourgeoisie to the working class--with the liberal-interventionist economic and social policy usually associated with Democratic administration.

The realization of the deadlock of state-manipulated economic regulation, the administration's inability to prevent the onset of increasingly frequent and more serious crises, the futility of the struggles against inflation and unemployment and the deterioration of American capitalism's international economic and political positions<sup>1</sup> began to be interpreted by broad segments of the American population first without the aid of press organs controlled by big capital as a result of excessive government interference in economic affairs, and the abolition of restriction of private capitalist initiative.

Unemployment, rise in taxes and the unequal distribution of the tax burden among various population strata played an important role in the mounting dissatisfaction with government economic policy. The so-called "middle strata," to which more than half of all American families belong, had to bear most of the burden. At the same time, they received much less from the government in the form of various social benefits. They derived another advantage: The redistribution of national income in favor of the underprivileged allowed the authorities to alleviate social tension and keep class contradictions from arising. But the conflicts or at least moderate tension considerably. Nevertheless, most middle-income Americans felt that they were being robbed. This led to the long-standing but still "repressed" revolt<sup>2</sup> and for a variety of anti-government activities, including hostility toward "big government" in general.

The erosion of the traditional values of Americanism, the crisis of faith in the basic institutions of the American society and the doubts about the validity of the postulates of the American way of life provided fertile ground for the growth of conservative, traditionalist feelings, which had always been common to the Republican Party, especially its right wing and all of the different rightwing-extremist organizations that had traditionally rallied round it (the Ku Klux Klan, the American Legion, the American Nazi Party), as well as the organizations of the "New Right," including rightwing religious groups (the Moral Majority, the Christian Voice, the Christian Roundtable and several others).

Another contributing factor was the series of serious failures of American foreign policy, which the ideologists of American conservatism described as "American humiliations" and the direct result of the policy of detente and superpower collusion with Moscow.

One inconsistency of the Carter Administration's domestic and foreign policy, the incompetence and inexperience of many of Carter's advisers and cabinet members and the President's own indecisiveness also played a role, motivating part of the "silent majority" to take the side of the Republican Party and contributing to the victory.

All of this provided grounds for the absolutely correct conclusion that the U.S. political scene moved to the right at the beginning of the 1980's. But was this swing a pronounced shift? Did it include the broad masses? Would it last long? The events of the past 2 years proved that this conclusion is absolutely more valid now than it appeared to be just recently.

The conservative program of the Republican Party in the form of "simple solutions to complex problems" led to the deterioration, and not the improvement, of domestic and foreign economic conditions.<sup>2</sup> It is not surprising that Reagan's presidential prestige (despite his personal popularity) had fallen lower than any other postwar president's at the beginning of his third year in office, as Table 1 shows. It is true that public opinion in America is quite "changeable" and that this opinion could easily be replaced by a more favorable picture of the President.<sup>3</sup> The wave of conservatism which engulfed the U.S. political stage at the turn of the decade,<sup>4</sup> has certainly not receded. But conservatism as a current of political ideology, as a rightwing radical variety of conservatism insisting the order "Backward, march!" and disregarding the additional realities of today's world, is obviously losing its appeal. Many serious political analysts are comparing Reaganism to "a mountain giving birth to a mouse" and are calling it a "flash in the pan," although it was just recently being described as nothing other than a promising current of American political development.

Therefore, we are less likely to wonder whether Reagan's move to the White House marked the beginning of a long era of Republican government than to consider whether Reaganism will leave the political stage even before the next presidential election will remain there for some time after the election if the incumbent feels able to win the nomination and be re-elected for another term. The answer to this question will depend largely on the Democratic Party's ability

In losing a narrow House vote (by political defeat, by 1981) and to offer an appealing alternative to "immoderate" housing and curbing inflation. The events of the next few months will decide the matter.

Table 2

Summary of Presidential Performance After 2 Years in Office, %

Category	Percentage of Public Approval
1. Foreign	48
2. Defense	41
3. Tax	47
4. Social	52
5. Economic	64
6. Domestic	76
7. Environment	69
8. Education	57

Source: Gallup surveys, in March 1981.

U.S. News and World Report, 31 January 1981.

(1)

One of the most significant economic policies, called "Reaganomics,"<sup>14</sup> is so obvious that it cannot be denied even by the most zealous supporters of this policy. Instead of encouraging quicker growth, the U.S. economy was stricken at the beginning of the 1980's by the most lengthy economic crisis of the last 50 years. In place of increased employment, the army of unemployed individuals now exceeds 11 million (more than 10 percent of the entire labor force); this is the highest level of unemployment since pre-war days. The largest budget deficit in U.S. history—around 200 billion dollars—is expected in the current fiscal year instead of the promised balanced federal budget by 1983. Instead of reducing government expenditures, the administration has constantly increased them, and military spending has increased at a particularly rapid rate—about 5 percent a year.

Of course, it would be wrong to blame all U.S. economic difficulties on the economic policy of the Republican Party. But it would be equally wrong to deny that the policy has aggravated the illnesses of the national economy, particularly the unproductive use of manpower and the bad state of government finances. The continuous interest rates on bank credit, stemming from the unbalanced budget deficit, have made emergence from the crisis more difficult in all United States and everywhere else in the capitalist world. This is a reflection of the major trouble of the extraordinarily badly recovered of the world capitalist economy.

The "Reaganomics" policy that there has not been enough time to implement has also created defects and disparities resulting from the inept



and Secretary of Defense. "The administration's incoherence in economic affairs, that admitted fact, has been well considered. There are no magic wands for the curing even of economic problems with a single wave of a magic wand, either--and it is the case of a country with a GNP close to 2 trillion dollars. At least, time, and a great deal of time, is lacking about changes in a economy of this size, as should be said, however, that the people who are now advising Carter's economic policies are the same people who were last year's economic surrogates, and their views of expectations and beliefs with their own offhanded remarks."

But let us return to the specific question: Will "Reaganomics" be able to bring about any real improvement of U.S. economic conditions over the medium to long term? If it is pursued for a fairly long period of time? This does not mean the mere recovery of the economy, which will take place sooner or later, but the achievement of conditions--that is, the elimination of such conditions as well as their obvious symptoms as mass unemployment, inflation, excessive government debt, and government financial disorder. Long-term improvement also presupposes long-awaited structural changes in the economy: the elimination of the most serious national economic disparities, the proper utilization of fixed productive capital, the augmentation of labor productivity and the return on capital and, at the very least, the preservation of a certain decline in the American people's standard of living.

The Reagan Administration is still asserting that the pursuit of its policy of "recovery" with its four-point program (reductions in taxes, federal spending, and government regulation and an increase in the total amount of money in circulation) and an arms race massive weapons buildup are the best way of solving the nation's problems. An objective analysis proves, however, that "Reaganomics" is unable to solve these problems or even to hasten their resolution. In the short run, the administration has been unable to pursue this policy. In the second, results have been completely unsatisfactory even when it has tried hard to carry out its plans.

The Reagan Administration's "Reaganomics" and its unproven promises, postulates, and promises of 1981-1982 spun like a house of cards as soon as it came into contact with reality.

The President and his advisors asserted so many times that the main purpose of "Reaganomics" was the reduction of taxes. In a burst of sincerity, Director J. Brinkman of the Office of Management and Budget even let it slip that all of the rhetoric of "supply-side economics" was invented simply to justify a radical tax cut benefiting mainly the owners of large fortunes.<sup>12</sup> And then was surprised. Less than a year after the famous tax reform of 1981, the President asked a bill through Congress for the collection of almost 100 billion dollars in new taxes in the next 3 years. In the beginning of 1983, he proposed additional "emergency" taxes for the collection of around 240 billion dollars within 3 years, although these were not to be imposed until after 1985 and only if other measures should prove inadequate.<sup>13</sup> Does this radical reversal not constitute an admission that one of the basic postulates of "Reaganomics" turned out to be untrue to be absolutely rejected?

The issue of the matter is not even that the present course of government economic policy is such that a smaller financial base could have serious

The following is a summary of the results of the study. The results show that the study was successful in identifying the factors that influence the growth of the economy. The study found that the growth of the economy is influenced by a number of factors, including the level of investment, the level of savings, and the level of government spending. The study also found that the growth of the economy is influenced by the level of inflation and the level of unemployment. The study concludes that the growth of the economy is a complex process that is influenced by a number of factors, and that the study has identified some of the key factors that influence the growth of the economy.

The study also found that the growth of the economy is influenced by the level of inflation and the level of unemployment. The study found that the level of inflation is a key factor that influences the growth of the economy. The study also found that the level of unemployment is a key factor that influences the growth of the economy. The study concludes that the growth of the economy is a complex process that is influenced by a number of factors, and that the study has identified some of the key factors that influence the growth of the economy.

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and a substantial lag between the initial decision and other military measures. The "first round" of the disarmament process will include the following: (1) the cessation of all offensive military and intelligence activities; (2) the taking of all necessary steps to ensure the security of the population; (3) the taking of all necessary steps to ensure the security of the environment; (4) the taking of all necessary steps to ensure the security of the economy; (5) the taking of all necessary steps to ensure the security of the culture; (6) the taking of all necessary steps to ensure the security of the society; (7) the taking of all necessary steps to ensure the security of the state; (8) the taking of all necessary steps to ensure the security of the world.

Figure 2 shows the results of the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839

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1. "The United States Economy," THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, February 1981.
2. In 1980-1981, for example, the average annual interest increase in labor contracts in the United States was 9.2 percent, whereas it was 6.1 percent in other industrially developed countries belonging to the OECD ("Economic Report of the President," February 1981, p. 51).
3. See, for example, V. M. Kudrov, "Three Centers of Imperialism: The Changing Balance of Power," MIKAL' EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No. 10; "Economic Comparison of the Main Capitalist Countries" (Facts and Statistics), 1981, No. 9; "The Comparative Scientific and Social Levels of the Main Capitalist Countries" ("Facts and Statistics") 1981, No. 10.
4. "American Challenge," a book that once created quite a stir, French journalist and politician G. L. Servan-Schreiber tried to direct attention to the world's second largest industrial power by the year 2000 would be "American industry in Europe" (New York, 1968).
5. "The Economic Policy of the U.S.A.," Moscow, 1981, p. 112.
6. Servan and Schreiber, "The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years," N.Y., 1967, p. 411.
7. "Economic Comparison of the United States," Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981, p. 400; 1980, p. 341; "The Budget of the U.S. Government," 1981, p. 400; "Economic Report of the President," January 1981, p. 50.
8. "The United States Economy," MIKAL' EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No. 10.

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE

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and from the report "Anger App. 23-25". The authors demand that the USSR agree to all proposals suggested by them to ensure the safety of direct communication and that regional offices of nuclear disarmament, including all interested nuclear powers, be given more attention. They place particular emphasis on the need for states to refuse to use offensive weapons against each other. Thus, we must point out, has already been done by the Soviet Union on a unilateral basis. The authors attach great importance to the system of mutual Soviet-U.S. consultations; the continuation of efforts to increase confidence-building measures; the establishment, maintenance and improvement of contacts between governments of nuclear powers to ensure the possibility of the "misinterpretation" or the accidental or conscious abuse of nuclear weapons (pp. 23-25).

Finally, some structural patterns of bourgeois thinking and representation (19th-20th) are inconsistent with the realities of the present state of international conditions, are absent in this work. Nevertheless, we must admit that some of the statements made by the Authors are consistent with a sensibly Humanistic, i.e., contemporary world vision.

14443-1110: "Political Culture: 'Society', 'USDA' and 'Government', political, (the) capital",

1946-1947, 1948-1949, 1950-1951, 1952-1953, 1954-1955, 1956-1957, 1958-1959, 1960-1961, 1962-1963, 1964-1965, 1966-1967, 1968-1969, 1970-1971, 1972-1973, 1974-1975, 1976-1977, 1978-1979, 1980-1981, 1982-1983, 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989, 1990-1991, 1992-1993, 1994-1995, 1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013, 2014-2015, 2016-2017, 2018-2019, 2020-2021, 2022-2023, 2024-2025, 2026-2027, 2028-2029, 2030-2031, 2032-2033, 2034-2035, 2036-2037, 2038-2039, 2040-2041, 2042-2043, 2044-2045, 2046-2047, 2048-2049, 2050-2051, 2052-2053, 2054-2055, 2056-2057, 2058-2059, 2060-2061, 2062-2063, 2064-2065, 2066-2067, 2068-2069, 2070-2071, 2072-2073, 2074-2075, 2076-2077, 2078-2079, 2080-2081, 2082-2083, 2084-2085, 2086-2087, 2088-2089, 2090-2091, 2092-2093, 2094-2095, 2096-2097, 2098-2099, 2100-2101, 2102-2103, 2104-2105, 2106-2107, 2108-2109, 2110-2111, 2112-2113, 2114-2115, 2116-2117, 2118-2119, 2120-2121, 2122-2123, 2124-2125, 2126-2127, 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and other... (The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the...)

After World War II, Adelman was a member of the group... (The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the...)

In 1946, Adelman was assigned to work in the United Nations... (The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the...)

From 1946 to 1948, Adelman was a member of the... (The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the...)

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (MARCH-MAY 1983)

1. *Pravda* (MOSCOW), *VOYENNAIA, DOKOLAZHENIYE* in Russian No 7, Jul 25 (signed by editor "P. I. I.") p. 12-13/7.

2. *VOEN* (Moscow).

3. *Pravda* (MOSCOW), 25. 7. 1983-Plenary sessions of the delegations at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe were held.

4. *Pravda* (MOSCOW) on editorial on "Washington-style equality," describing the American side's categorical approach to the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

5. *Pravda* (MOSCOW) in the second edition of a propaganda brochure, "Soviet Military Strength," was announced in the United States. This brochure, with a foreword by Secretary of Defense G. Weinberger, tries to "prove" that the USSR is a military superpower in all arms and is preparing for protracted war with the expectation of winning this war, while the United States is preparing for peace and therefore "must put an end to its military inferiority to the USSR" by increasing military spending.

6. *Pravda* (MOSCOW) addressed the 41st annual congress of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando (Florida) with a provocative speech, denouncing the current American Administration's ability to think only in terms of confrontation and rapid militarization.

7. *Pravda* (MOSCOW) 27. 8. 83. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved a resolution calling for a U.S.-Soviet Agreement on a verifiable mutual freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons.

8. A conference on "American-Soviet Relations: Dialogue Between Peoples" was held in Capitol Hill. It was convened at the suggestion of several American religious and public organizations, the Ford for New Priorities in America. The conference called for the curtailment of the arms race and the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet international alliance and advised trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the United States.

9. A group of congressmen and congresswomen, public and religious figures on both sides in support of the nuclear freeze resolution at a press conference in Washington.

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
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10--The message of Soviet scholars to all scholars of the world on the Reagan Administration's declared plans for the development of antimissile weapons was published.

11--PRAVDA printed an editorial--"Who Is Threatening Whom?"--on the actual state of affairs at the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

12--General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov's replies to USA SPINER magazine (780) were published.

13--Academy awards were awarded to new foreign members of the USSR Academy of Sciences in a ceremony in the Soviet embassy in Washington. They were awarded to members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, University of Illinois Professor John Gribben (physics), University of California Professor Emil Smith (biochemistry) and Colorado State University Professor Gilbert White (geography). The credentials were awarded by Soviet Ambassador to the United States A. P. Izrael.

14--The Soviet press published a telegram addressed to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov from a group of renowned American scientists and public figures, appealing for the prohibition of space weapons, and Yu. V. Andropov's reply. It is precisely the Soviet Union "that initiated and participated in all existing international agreements aimed at the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the good of mankind," he stressed in his reply. "I can assure you that the Soviet Union will continue to make a maximum effort to counteract the sinister plans to extend the arms race to outer space."

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16--General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov spoke at a reception in the Kremlin honoring a party and governmental delegation from the FRG. "We must reach an agreement on the equality of nuclear potential in Europe in terms of carriers and warheads, and naturally with consideration for British and French weapons," Yu. V. Andropov said. "Anyone who refuses our proposal will take on a grave responsibility to the people of Europe and the entire world, as each lost week and lost day in the conclusion of an agreement heighten the danger of nuclear war."

17--The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a statement to the U.S. embassy in the Soviet Union, describing the American official statements about the "threat" posed to Iran by the Soviet Union as an absurd lie.

18--A group of influential senators and members of the House of Representatives sent President Reagan a letter expressing the increasing worries in Congress about the dangerous nature of U.S. nuclear strategy.

19--A group of Americans visiting the USSR on the initiative of an American organization called the Committee for Dialogue Between American and Soviet Citizens held a press conference in Moscow. In a joint statement, the members

of the group declared that victory is impossible in a nuclear war, advised the quickest possible attainment of practical results in START and pointed out the importance of broader dialogue between the two countries.

4--The House of Representatives approved a resolution calling for a "mutual, verifiable" freeze on all types of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons and the conclusion of a nuclear arms reduction agreement.

8--The Democratic senator from Michigan, C. Levin, accused the U.S. President of juggling the facts in his assessment of U.S. and Soviet military potential, particularly with regard to nuclear strength.

10--A TASS statement on the situation in Lebanon was published. "Israel and the United States," it said, "are flagrantly violating Lebanon's sovereignty and its legal right to safeguard its own security."

11--The technological assessment office of the American Congress reported that Washington's embargo and restrictions on trade and economic relations with the USSR had not had the negative effects on the Soviet economy anticipated by the White House, but had, to the contrary, rebounded against the United States.

13--Prominent American scientists, specializing in space research, issued an appeal to the Reagan Administration for the immediate commencement of talks with the Soviet Union on the prohibition of the emplacement and use of any weapon in space.

17--The Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe resumed in Geneva.

18--The House Appropriations Committee approved the program for the production and deployment of 100 strategic MX missiles, which had previously been approved by the committee's counterpart in the Senate.

19, 24--Plenary sessions of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe were held.

26-31--Representatives of the Soviet and American public met in Minneapolis (Minnesota). The meeting was organized jointly by the Washington Institute for Policy Studies and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the USSR-USA Society and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

28--A Soviet government statement was published. It said, in particular: "The U.S. administration has taken an unconstructive, obstructionist line in all talks directly or indirectly connected with the curtailment of the arms race. This applies to U.S. behavior at the talks in Geneva, Vienna and Madrid and in other international forums." The Soviet Union declared that "it is not too late to stop the dangerous escalation of tension."

29--The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois made a decision reaffirming the absolute illegality of the actions of the American authorities who have kept the Polovchak family from seeing their son Vladimir for 3 years.

30--The U.S. State Department refused to issue visas to a delegation from the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Sea and River Fleet Workers, invited to the United States on a return visit by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters of the East Coast of America.

31--Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR A. Hartman at his request.

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